Incel: the Strange Identity That Became a Weapon Against Feminism

The incels are coming. Hide the socks.

The word incel means different things to different people, which means for dangerous discussions. On the surface, all it takes to qualify as an incel is to be involuntarily celibate, a fairly common turn of fate that most people experience at least once, and yet a community of homegrown extremists and terrorists have taken up the label incel to describe something darker: a defeatist mentality asserting that women (and especially feminists) have doomed a large percentage of men to implacable misery.

If by “incel”, one means a misogynist or extremist, than nothing is acceptable but an utter desire to end that culture. Of course, to attack incels as people risks association with one of the oldest pillars of patriarchy: virgin shaming. This is why I don’t like the term incel: the extremists began using it to sympathy, but also to recruit, because although pathological misogynists are uncommon, people suffering annoying dry spells (and in the ages of 15–25, when people are most susceptible to propaganda, they are mostly men) are not.

Make no mistake about the incel identity, though: whatever the word meant once, it has lately been used as a self-identification by a culture and ideology so frightening, retrogressive, misogynistic, and downright insane  that it takes a strong stomach to look at it square-on.

In an age of proliferating identities, where personality traits become labels, and we have terms like demisexual, otherkin, wagecuck and NEET flying about, the identity of incel is perhaps the strangest, because it fixates on what is, for almost everyone in fact, a transient frustration. Sexually speaking, there’s an order of magnitude more demand for young (18–23) women than men of that age, and so this period of time is unpleasant for most men. It’s so much so that societies have to invent ways to deal with it: prostitution is an old one, and martial culture (giving young men a source of worth) is another. College is yet another technique that tries to handle it, by culturally and geographically isolating 18–22 year olds so young men have a chance. Mostly, though, this problem is managed privately using wealth transfer, especially around social and cultural capital where there’s enough ambiguity to make it socially acceptable. Young men from privilege get set up, by their parents and inherited networks, with precocious career advancement to give them esteem, build their confidence, and make maximize their “eligibility” when they hit the golden score of male sexual attractiveness (25 to 44) and look for marital partners. The rest of the young men can go die, as far as conservative patriarchal societies like our late-stage corporate capitalism are concerned.

That’s what’s so weird about incel rage. These men are blaming women for something that patriarchy did to them. Women didn’t create the Hollywood narrative under which only young sex counts (quite opposite from the truth) and a man is a loser if a virgin at 25. Women didn’t crash the job market. Women didn’t drive up college tuitions. Patriarchy– and about 90 percent of the people running it are men– did that.

Inherent in the incel worldview is the notion that this transient state– an unfavorable sexual power balance, since women reach high levels of sexual attractiveness so much earlier than men– will last forever. Average- and even above-average-looking incels declare themselves “ugly” based on facial bone structure traits that haven’t been fetishized as much since the racist pseudoscience of the late 19th century. Male grievance culture isn’t new; it’s been around forever. What is new is the degree of despair and violence. It wouldn’t have been able to hit a critical mass until recently. Male grievance culture– from mainstream sexism in the 1950s and ’60s, to the rakish porn-star chauvinism of the 1970s and ’80s, to the pickup artistry of the 1990s and ’00s, to the raving misogyny of incels today– has been increasingly cult-like with each iteration. What gives a true cult its ultimate hard-on? Apocalypse. What did it take to bring the incel phenomenon about? Socioeconomic collapse.

The economic changes of 2008 were managed well-enough to protect the wealthier and older people by keeping asset prices up. Socioeconomically, however, they were cataclysmic and most of society is underappreciative of the damage that has been done. We’ll be reeling from this, fifty years from now. The shithole we let our society become, that’ll kill people in the future even if we fix everything now. For example, people will die in 2060 because of anti-medical prejudices and bad habits developed, right now, in this era of unaffordable, lousy care, atrocious coverage, and adversarial behavior by employers and insurers who’ll break a social contract (and often a legal one) as soon as there’s a dollar in it. The world changed; an apocalypse actually happened.

What does this have to do with incels? Well, they are a post-apocalyptic creature. What makes them unnerving and sometimes disgusting is their complete lack of insight into the nature of the apocalypse inflicted upon them. They blame women for a social calamity– one that has left them hurting and miserable– that was, in fact, caused by corporate capitalism.

Incels believe that priapic creatures like “Chads” (the male entitlement figure of yesteryear) and “Tyrones” (an offensive African-American stereotype) scour the wasteland of modern human sexuality and fight over the last remaining “pure” women like junkyard animals. Names that Chicagoans and Twin Cities residents used to describe less-sophisticated Midwesterners who gave the region a bad name– Trixie, Chad, Becky and Cam– have mutated into supposed creatures one would expect to fight in the 2300 AD world of Chrono Trigger. Anyway, in this post-apocalyptic, over-fucked and semen-drenched world, everyone’s having lots of sex– frequent, amazing sex, because that totally happens at 18, and also inexplicably stops around 23– except them.

 

I’ve spent months studying human sexuality, in part as background research for Farisa’s Crossing, since I’m having to build characters with sexualities different from my own. You’d think there’d be data to support this sexual apocalypse, if one were going on. Nope. For example, infidelity and marital failure are becoming less common, as is participation in high school and college casual sex. The culture’s healing, not falling apart. What’s driving it? It turns out that feminism is a good thing, especially for so-called “beta” males who lack the glib charm, aggressive presence, irresponsible risk-seeking and financial resources to succeed at high-frequency casual promiscuity.

It’s patriarchy that drives women into the arms of boorish alpha males– the sorts who climb corporate hierarchies– not feminism. When women don’t have to marry early out of economic necessity, and when they choose their husbands instead of having those choices made by their fathers or economic forces, so-called “beta” males win (contrary to “Chad” phobia) more often than the aggressive, boorish men our society deems “alpha”.

Incels and MRAs halfway acknowledge female maturation, but because they’re so obsessed with casual sex, they’ve built up another toxic narrative to explain it.

The worst men seem to win at casual sex. No one disputes this. Even if decent men are having casual sex– and one must be careful about terminology here: does it count as casual if it becomes a legitimate relationship? what about if it happens between two close friends?– it is most often the case that the indecent are loud about it. Perhaps normal people are doing all kinds of stuff only they know about, but the loudest cultural narrative one sees in casual sex is that of macho, entitled men taking advantage of women with low self-esteem (often, victims of abuse) with copious alcohol in the mix. This is unhealthy; it’s hideous. Is it the sexual mainstream? No.

There is no sexual apocalypse. Terminological debates aside, casual sex and in particular stranger sex (to which incel fantasies about hyper-aggressive demonic men absconding with superficial women might apply) seem to be going down. This variety of sexuality, perhaps deserving of its vilification for its superficiality and tendency to spread disease, isn’t common at all. Most women have no casual encounters; or they have one, don’t like it, and never do it again; or they only have them when led to believe (often by unscrupulous men such as “pickup artists”) that romantic relationships are forming, which is not their fault. Few women knowingly have causal sex and they don’t enjoy it: only about 10 percent of women orgasm on a one-night-stand. In this light, the incel mythology about women pining for selfish “Chads” is a bit absurd to anyone who understands sex. Monogamous relationships, which women overwhelmingly prefer (with a few exceptions), are very much in, and feminism is no threat to them.

There’s a difference, of course, between a dry spell and an apocalypse: between weather and climate collapse. Like most 20-year-old men, I was socially and romantically unsuccessful compared to what I wanted to be at that age, but I knew it would get better. At that age, women have all the options and men have maximal competition; it improves. Incels, on the other hand, have tied themselves to the mast with an extreme notion that there’s no hope. Most of these guys aren’t unattractive or seriously disabled (except, perhaps, for often-treatable mental illnesses) and they come overwhelmingly from the middle class of the English-speaking world. They live in diverse countries where they could easily meet women from all sorts of cultural backgrounds. It is not hopeless, at least sexually speaking, for them at all; if they evicted the misogynistic, cultish garbage from their heads, they’d be fine.

They just need something better to do with themselves. See, the way we handled dry spells, back before the 0.1 percent trashed the economy, was to focus on our careers. Those existed back then. There was a time– in 2018, it’s hard to imagine this– when applying for jobs actually worked. Transiently sexless men had something to do other than stew about experiences they weren’t having.

We are not in a sexual apocalypse caused by feminism. We are in a socioeconomic apocalypse caused by corporate capitalism– also known sometimes as “the patriarchy”, though I dislike this term because it demonizes fatherhood, and it gives too much credit to an oppressive system. We must know who our true enemies really are. Incels have allowed themselves to become useful idiots, who blame the malfeasance of corporate patiarchy on women.

Incels aren’t miserable because of women. They’re not miserable because they aren’t getting sex, because it’s always been hard for young men to get sex, and because sexless doesn’t always lead to such rage. To wit, most 60-year-old widows become involuntarily celibate, but don’t fall into rage. These men are miserable because society has subjected them to a long con. They’ve been swindled. Society has stuffed their minds full of rotten ideas that are leading them down a bad road.

When a corporate-capitalist society such as Mussolini’s Italy or Corporate America perceives peace, it does not go out of its way to differentiate gender roles: for example, in overt governmental fascism, men and women are both told they must support the state; in our covert employer-nucleated fascism, the directive is to support a manager’s career and hope to be invited to ride his coattails. When such a society perceives war, though, gender roles emerge: the woman becomes a soldier factory, favored for her ability to produce children of the master race; men become sacrificial and are told to accept posthumous glory, for not all will survive what the society decides it must do.

Our time is unique, in that peace and war have become one, like the gas and liquid phases of a supercritical fluid. Most Americans do not sacrifice, as we would in war– meat and sugar are not rationed, gas prices of $3 per gallon are cause for complaint– and the wealthiest quarter of us can live in peaceful prosperity. At the same time, war surrounds us: two campaigns we started (with unclear intention) last decade still rage in the Middle East; our appetite for drugs has financed violence and upheaval from Juarez to Medellin; and social media drama can render an individual unemployable (and blacklisting is, I would argue, an act of war). In what state are we? A peace with pockets of war, or a war that looks like peace? If war, who is fighting whom?

Patriarchal and fascistic societies ramp up toxic masculinity in preparation for war, especially when they intend to be the aggressor, and wind it down (into smoldering chauvinism, as in the 1950s) during peace. So what’s our state today? We live in a mostly-peaceful but tenuous time of asymmetric economic war. Overt acts of aggression (health insurance denials; negative employment references and blacklisting; social-media harassment campaigns; poisoning of public water resources) are fairly uncommon, but terrifying, rapid in their onset, and hard to prevent or control. We live in a time where 140 characters from a powerful person can send fifty unconnected strangers to harass any target in the world. We live in a time when workers get fired, quite literally by computers whose sole purpose is performance surveillance; the manager’s only function is to read the monthly print-out and deliver the bad news.

It’s important to understand that, while this war is different from any other, it is a real war. The 0.1 percent has not been waging “class war”, some inferior category thereof, against the rest of us. It is, and has been for a long time, an actual war. People have died because of it.

Incels get the nature of this calamity wrong. They’re too young to know about health insurance, and they haven’t gotten in the corporate world yet, which is why they think it’s only women who are capable of maltreating people. It’s impossible to sympathize with the militant incels, because they lash out at innocents, but they are perceptive of the fact that an apocalypse is underway. Their mistake is that they mischaracterize it. Millennials really have been fucked over by previous generations.

Had the upper class not stabbed us in the back, we know what society would look like, and we know because this is what was like, forty years ago: if you had a car and a college education, you could talk your way on to a job anywhere in the country. You’d call an executive on Thursday, have an hour-long lunch with him on Friday, and start on Monday. If you were 27 or older, you’d get a management-level job. If you were 32 or older, you’d get an executive job. If the job required an advanced degree, the company would send you back to school. If it was 1:30 in the afternoon and you were still working, you were a go-getter who’d get every promotion. This is the country we used to have, and our elite took it from us, and we should be willing to fight them– to die, and even to kill, if necessary– if we stand a chance of getting it back.

What killed our society, starting in the 1970s? The right wing wants people to believe that social advances (feminism, gender liberalism) had something to with the economic degradation that began around the same time. That could not be farther from the truth. In fact, the situation for women and racial minorities has been declining of late, specifically because of worsening economic inequality and job prospects. So what did go to hell in the late 1970s? Again, the culprit is toxic masculinity.

The elite of the 1940s–70s saw themselves as a national elite and took pride in making the country better: building libraries and museums, supporting progressive causes, and making education more available. To the extent that this can be gendered (and at the time, it was) this was a productive masculinity that brought society (and, over time, women) forward. Toxic masculinity never took a break, but in economics, it was on defense for a solid forty years, only to rage back into focus in the 1980s. Why?

One might be tempted to pin our society’s self-created decline on “the Reagan Era”, but I don’t think one conservative politician can be blamed for everything that happened. Rather, as we became increasingly connected, our national elite re-polarized. This ties in to our hatred for Baby Boomers. Most Baby Boomers aren’t the privileged assholes we love to hate on– the traditional Boomer narrative ignores black Boomers, gay Boomers, dead-in-Vietnam Boomers, and Boomers who fought for the rights of minorities or engaged in the (alas, losing) battle against corporate supremacy. But the Boomer 1% deserves its horrible reputation. These were the guys who compared themselves to oil sheikhs, third-world despots, narcotraficantes, and (after 1990) post-Soviet kleptocrats and decided that the American CEO– making $400,000 per year, and having to follow his country’s laws– was the short man in the group.

The lesson from the Boomer 1% is to forget Milton’s comparison of reigning in hell versus serving in heaven. From a material perspective, it is even superior to reign in hell over reigning in heaven. The 1980s is the decade when our elite began intentionally de-civilizing us in order to join the slurry of kleptocratic garbage that is the global elite.

It is hard to imagine reversing the above. The national elite, as it once was, is dead. After selling us out, it was subsumed into the malevolent global one. Toxic masculinity runs the world again– to everyone’s detriment. It’s the force that drives a man with $1 billion to want $10 billion, or a man with a beautiful wife to cheat because he has decided that the world owes him 10 (and then 100) beautiful women. It is not enough for him to drink and enjoy his milkshake. He must drink all the milkshakes, even if he throws up afterward.

Incels are not the men running the world, of course. They’re not drinking any milkshakes. In fact, they’re triple-threat losers. They’re sexual losers because of their social alienation and self-sabotaging tendencies, perhaps inherited from our puritanical culture’s views of sex as dirty (amplified by an envy of the mature and less inhibited). They’re social losers because toxic masculinity says in no uncertain terms that low-status, unsuccessful men are worth less than garbage and ought to be viewed with suspicion. They’re economic losers because the high-autonomy middle-class jobs (which would be fantastic plum positions by today’s standards) have been replaced by technologically surveilled and menial subordinate work. They exhibit toxic masculinity in their odious attitudes toward women, but they’ve also been crushed by it.

The logical fallacies of the male grievance culture are too numerous to list– each one could get an essay of its own– but the most prominent (no pun intended) is the apex fallacy. An apex fallacy exists when one compares the most successful or fortuante of one group against the average-case performance or outcomes of one’s own. Reactionaries and nostalgists often indulge in apex fallacies, comparing their lot as average people today to those of kings, knights and ladies– not peasants who die at 33 of typhoid. Likewise, incels believe that women drown in male attention because they’re hyperfocused on the white, blonde, young “Stacies” that so many other men are chasing. Apex fallacies exist, likely, because it is advantageous to observe the most successful individuals. When the pinnacle of a society is corrupt, calamity is likely to follow for that reason– bad examples are being set– and we should be scared for that reason. Incels look at the top of society and see people devoid of virtue– the unaccountable, unscrupulous, self-indulgent “Chads”, almost always from well-connected families– winning. Their most noted reaction, “Why can’t that be me?”, is hardly sympathetic, but their problem is. In terms of male role models, our society is in dissolution.

Corporate capitalism, and other forms of dysfunctional patriarchy, cannot keep themselves afloat without using various narratives to manipulate people’s desires and therefore allay the resentment that would otherwise accrue to the corrupt top. For example, it is patriarchy (not feminism) that tells men they are worthless if they cannot support a family on one income. To be a “basement dweller”, under patriarchy, is to be less than human. The system tells men to derive their sense of worth from capability, especially as expressed in competitive endeavors– even if those contests are dehumanizing or stupid. In high school and college, one of the most fetishized (but also most detrimental to personal growth) competence metrics is the ability to procure sex when one wants it. (And, further according to this narrative, men always want sex; or else there is something wrong with them.) When incels struggle with a normal, benign thing– that it is difficult for men under 25 to find sexual partners– they begin to see themselves as useless incompetence, doomed to fail in all other areas of life. They shut down; they lose contact with their friends, their grades drop, and they become addicted to video games and internet trolling– living out their power fantasies behind a keyboard.

What does patriarchy think of this massive waste of male talent? Patriarchy couldn’t be happier. See, virgin shaming is what keeps men going into work, in order to procure those pictures of dead people, that can be traded for social experiences like overpriced meals and recreational neurotoxins, that may on occasion lead to sexual access.

There’s a response I can imagine coming from incels and MRAs, which is that women, as much as men, can participate in virgin shaming, gold digging, and various other behaviors that keep toxic masculinity in place. Of course, that’s true. See, feminism doesn’t require a conviction that women are innately morally superior to men. I am a feminist and hold no such belief. I think the distributions of moral character are most likely equivalent across genders. And just as there are good men aligned with feminist causes, there are plenty of women who lend their support to patriarchy, who enforce its doctrines, and even who prefer to live within it. Women actually exist who uphold toxic values by making themselves available to the sorts of malignant, aggressive men running our civilization into the ground. It is not acknowledge of their existence that makes MRAs and incels problematic; it is their inaccurate believe that immature, damaged women are somehow representative of the gender (they are not) that makes this dangerous. The truth is that, in a world with billions of people within it, you’re bound to find everything.

What is feminism? I think it has two components. One is the belief that women ought to have equal political and economic rights to men. That, on itself, doesn’t need to be called feminism. If this were all there were to the feminist cause, I’d have no issue with people who say, “I’m not a feminist; I’m an equalist”. The second component pertains not to biological femaleness but to femininity. This gets tricky, because it’s not clear that any of the differences between “masculine” and “feminine” nature exist in any innate way. Any discussion of masculinity and femininity must be relative to a cultural frame. There’s a lot of virtue– compassion, judgment, quiet competence, collaboration over competition, sexual restraint– that lives in what out culture construes as feminine. What makes toxic masculinity so virulent is that it’s built to destroy the feminine. It does not necessarily hate females; it hates femininity in women, but especially in men. What we’re learning, as our late-stage corporate capitalism destroys the planet ecologically, culturally, and socially as well as economically, is that in order to survive for another century, we’re going to have to become more feminine. It is not about women as superior to men (I do not think they are) but the need for us, as humans, to evolve in a more feminine direction and, while retaining masculinity’s virtues, purge it of its aggressive and toxic elements.

Feminism also has tons of historical support. Making things better for women also makes the world better for men. Gender is not a zero-sum game.

Self-indulgence is often marked by misogynists (most likely, a case of projection) as a female vice, but it’s actually the core of toxic masculinity. This is not to say that female self-indulgence and toxic femininity don’t exist– every woman who demands an expensive carbon crystal before she’ll marry is engaging in an instance of toxic femininity (manufactured by toxic men in the diamond industry)– but it seems to be toxic masculinity that is most capable of metastasis. Toxic masculinity says: one must grow up and acquire, acquire, acquire; one must do it fast; and one who acquires less than other men is inferior and not really a man at all. Accrued wealth and paid work– the influence of family contacts, though it accounts for almost all of what actaully happens in the career game– become the sole, numerical metric of male value. One cannot criticize the might-makes-right corporate system, either, unless one wants to risk being called “whiny”, “weak”, “a snowflake”, or (who can forget this classic?) “a fag”.

Corporate capitalism and toxic masculinity are cruel, and there’s no moral justification for shoehorning 50 percent of the population into it (and forcing the other 50 percent to clean up). But is this brand of masculinity a con? I don’t think it always was. In the 1950s, there was real work to be done, and people could make a living by doing it. Competence and merit actually mattered: there were more small businesses, it was easier for a skilled person to escape a reputation problem and reinvent himself, and there was high federal investment in R&D, resulting in 4–6 percent annual economic growth. For all the flaws of that era– I can’t think of anyone sane who’d want to restore 1950s gender or race relation– it was a time when work worked.

Keynes predicted that, by now, we’d be working about 5–10 hours per week. That turned out to be right. So where’s our leisure society? Nowhere, because of the Graeberian imperative to hold position. People now spend 10 hours to work a 2-hour day, the rest of the time full of useless anxiety in open-plan offices that exist largely to humiliate them. If the bosses figure out how little work is necessary, they’ll cut jobs and workers will lose, so it must be hidden. The work being done almost never matters; it is mostly a commodity, and little respect accrues to people who do actual work. Instead, we’re a nation of professional reputation managers. If you’re not disgusted by the notion, you’re not human. Of course, this means that the winners of the new economy are those people (mostly, physically imposing men, because even though such violent confrontations have been rare for thousands of years– it’s now how we like to do business– it is just easier to ask for favors when one could physically end the other’s life) who can force others to manicure their own personal reputations. Neofeudalism sets in: those who have permanent staffs of reputation managers (of course, the firms that employ them fully believe real work is being done, and occasionally it is) become lords, and those who support their campaigns for relevance in a blandly decadent, pointless economic system become the vassals.

One can see this most prominently in that people do things that are more work-like for their hobbies– gardening, hunting, hiking, learning new fields, writing– than the stupid, sedentary, humiliating subordinate bullshit they endure in under the proto-fascist corporate regime of status reports about status reports they call “work”. Men (and women) used to go to work and do things, but now they go to work and subordinate to other, almost always completely useless, men.

Isn’t this ancient, though? Hasn’t work always been about subordination? Well, yes and no. This topic requires more words than I can give it, but complex endeavors always require operational subordination. That is, some people have to take direction from others, and apprentices need more direction than seasoned masters. There’s nothing wrong with operational subordination; we do it every day, to our benefit, when we stop at a red traffic signal. It is better to follow a sound order and wait two minutes than to disobey it and possibly die in a preventable traffic accident. Operational subordination isn’t humiliating; it’s just something we need to do. In today’s corporate climate, though, the demand has gone beyond lawful operational subordination into personal subordination. It is not enough for the worker to take direction; he must fully accept the total superiority of the manager. It is not enough to do the job well; he must pretend to like it, he must ask for more grunt work when he is underutilized, and he can never for a second allow anyone to hold the suspicion that he might be smarter than the mediocre apparatchik doling out the tasks.

Here is where I offend some leftists: it may be entirely due to socialization, but men and women are different. Women are, to put it bluntly, better actors. They learn how to be pleasant to people they dislike, to mirror emotions without feeling them, and to engage in the ceremony of personal subordination while, in fact, avoiding major compromise. They’re socialized to put a crumple zone between them and abuse that is coming from uphill. Perhaps that’s why, even though corporate culture is terrible for women, it’s devastating to men. Women can play a humiliating, stupid game– powdering the bottoms and attending the whims of adult babies called “executives”– without total personal collapse, whereas men seem unable to do so. I don’t think the explanation is that men are weaker; I think we are not socialized as well to be actors– to be able to play a humiliating, subordinate role for 8 hours per day without internalizing it– and that we are also pushed to identify with paid work (a problem, in an economy where humiliation is the only thing left most people will pay for) more than women are.

If you tell men that the highest expression of masculinity is to go into a workplace and subordinate to other men– not the temporary operational subordination of the apprentice, but a permanent personal subordination to better-placed, my-daddy-made-a-call mediocrity– you’re going to have a masculine crisis on your hands. And we do. While I won’t get into detail about Jordan Peterson, his appeal seems to derive from his willingness to address the masculine crisis head-on, without fear. (This is not to say that he knows how to solve it.) But here’s the truth: our masculine crisis will not be solved until we eradicate artificial scarcities (which exist to manipulate men into working hard, on the promise that those proxies for female sexual attention– job titles, higher salaries– actually mean something) and corporate capitalism itself. To kill corporate capitalism, we’ll need to institute a more compassionate society– one that takes care of people, sending them to school if they wish, paying favors forward without expecting immediate return– and that would be, traditionally, more feminine. So we have the odd-sounding-but-true conclusion that the solution to our masculine crisis is (in part) feminism.

What was done to these incels was not done by women. It was done to them by patriarchy: a system that has inculcated the notion of women as sexual objects and rewards for participating in an economic system that professes to be meritocracy but that, on closer inspection, is no further along an evolutionary journey than might-makes-right barbarism. They are just entitled-men-the-enemy. They have been infected by terrible ideas and they are suffering intensely. And while their expressions of rage, both on and off the internet, are often unacceptable, we must raise our focus away from this particular element, and smash the woman-hating, racist, elitist, proto-fascist corporate system that created them in the first place.

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The Green Pill: the Case for Doing the Right Thing; Why Feminism Is Good for Men, Too; and What to Learn from “Incels”.

Fifteen years ago, I got taken in by the male grievance cult and swallowed its nonsense whole: pickup artists, Chads, dual mating strategies… all that garbage, though we had different names for the stuff. It was the same ugly culture, thought it seems to have gotten worse. I was what would today be called an “incel”: unsuccessful with women, and seething with rage. I’m ashamed of my participation in that world, and in the then-fledgling art of internet trolling, seeing what all the nonsense has led to.

Today, for a contrast, I’m happily married to a feminist woman, and I’m writing Farisa’s Crossing, a novel with a female protagonist. What changed? Well, the time in between has been quite interesting, and I think there’s something one could learn from my own zero’s journey into (and, later, out of) the “red pill” world of male grievance culture. Yet, every time I sit down to write “that” essay… I just fucking can’t. I don’t like reliving it. Today’s incel phenomenon hits too close to home. I read delusional, angry screeds on the “braincels” subreddit or various other incel forums, and I remember a time when I could have believed (or even said) such things. It gives me a headache.

Forgive me if this is raw. I’m not a saint. I don’t judge the male grievance community– increasingly like a cult in its commitment to a set of incorrect, self-defeating, and misogynistic beliefs with no bearing in reality– from a place of superiority. I was there once. I got taken in, and I got out. I know how it operates, and I know why it appeals to some young men.

What is it that drives young men, while they endure that oppressively quotidian and not especially harmful problem of early-adulthood sexual infrequency, into such rage and despair? Well, I think everyone should watch this video about charismatic anger. Rage spreads. Fear sells a story. Angry memes stick in the mind, regardless of truth. Add to this some confirmation bias, apex fallacies, and ready-made excuses for one’s own sexual infrequency– “it’s not me; it’s all women”– and you get a self-defeating complex that takes years to evict from one’s head. As with a cult’s illogic, smart and otherwise rational people don’t seem to be immune to this.

Most of the guys who get taken in male grievance culture are like me around age 20: decent men in a vulnerable, difficult time where the rules are unclear, it’s hard to know what’s going on, and everyone else seems to be doing better. That said, the luminaries of this culture seem to be an assortment of loathsome creatures, such as: white nationalists (who argue that multiculturalism and miscegenation have caused the incel’s problems), domestic abusers, pedophiles (who wish to normalize their perversion by demonizing adult female sexuality), and the sex addicts who call themselves “pickup artists”.

The male grievance cult, in other words, draws its strength from the worst of the male gender.

Blue, Red, Black and Green Pills

Mainstream American culture doesn’t indulge in the overt misogyny of incels or pickup artists, but one of politically correct hypocrisy. We claim to be liberal and vote conservative. We support a might-makes-right economic system, corporate capitalism, in which economically successful men (until 2017) were able to maltreat women with impunity; it was one of the perks of being an executive. This corporatized, paper-thin, dishonest culture I call chauvalry: a combination of chivalry and chauvinism. It’s what the male grievance culture calls the blue pill.

The blue pill’s not feminist. It’s the worldview of the Hollywood movie where being “a nice guy” and working for hard for his boss is enough that a man “ought to” get sex any time he wants it. In romantic comedies, it shows us male behaviors that would actually put someone in jail: ticketless airport runs, stalker-level displays of singular attention at the Act-2/Act-3 transition, punching guys in the face who look at one’s girlfriend the wrong way. It tells men that if they do the right thing, two hours of cat saving ought to be enough to attract women– even if a man is still in high school. That’s not how it works. An exercise montage stands in for the hundreds of hours it takes to fix or improve an ill-cared-for body. Adults know this, but adolescents might not fully get it.

The blue pill, “nice guy” worldview is casually misogynistic. It indulges in just world fallacies that suit our corporate masters. Do what you’re told for fifty weeks, it says, and your beautiful wife will give you hot sex on your two-week vacation. Be the hard-working “all-American” guy, and you’ll get laid, no problem. It presents sex as the ultimate validation of male virtue, and women as a sort of “insert compliments and free dinners, receive blowjobs and nookie” vending machine. You don’t have to go to the gym and become an attractive person, or read books and become an interesting person; just show up at your job, and a pretty girl will come by and touch your dick, we promise.

Of course, sex is not (nor should it be) the measure of male virtue. Men are not owed sex for being productive members of society; they are not owed sex at all from anyone who does not want to have sex with them.

Usually by the first or second year of college, men realize that the blue-pill story is fraudulent. They see useless men getting ample sexual activity in high school and they’re told that it’s different in college. Whether they go to a state school or to Harvard, it isn’t. Actually, I don’t think that useless men are getting more sex on average than anyone else; they’re just the ones who make a trophy out of it. The decent people are having sex, too; they’re just not talking about it.

In The Matrix, the protagonist is offered a choice: take the blue pill and persist in self-deception, or take the red one and engage reality, starting on a hero’s journey. The male grievance community co-opted this metaphor, and starting using the term “red pill” to describe their alternative, less corporate but more vicious, misogyny. Of course, what they call “red pill” isn’t any more reflective of reality than the blue pill worldview they reject (and that all thinking adults know to be a facade). But, they took that term first, and we’re stuck with it that way.

The red pill view of women and relationships is much more dismal. It views all of us (male and female) as selfish, hypersexual, narcissistic and obsessed with physical appearances. Coming from a mix of failed providers who fared poorly in divorces– most divorces aren’t “won” by the woman, but impair both parties’ finances– and sex-addicted pickup artists, the red-pill view that dominates male grievance culture is intensely negative. For example, the typical red-pill view of women is that they all secretly long for domineering men (“Chad”, in incel lore) who will degrade them.

In the early 2000s, the process was called “speed seduction” or “Game”; now it’s known as pickup artistry. The truth about pickup artists is that they’re often insecure, disease-ridden, broken men. Their lives aren’t enviable. Their high-frequency promiscuity is mostly made possible by lowering of standards. A bona fide sex addict doesn’t care if she’s a “9/10” marriage-worthy chemical engineer or a “3/10” disease-ridden drunk party girl, and relationally-impaired men often can’t sustain the effort necessary to attract the former. However, their unhealthy lifestyles have given them hypertrophic social ability. They know what a certain subclass of women, selected for rapid sexual availability, want.

What makes pickup artistry so dangerous an art for a young man to learn is that (as with cults) the first courses and modules will focus on what 97% of people (i.e., the ones who know it) would call common sense: basic social skills and grooming: don’t talk about sex on the first date, wear dark colors to seem more masculine, do between 25 and 40 percent of the talking. All of this advice actually works, contradicting that two-word blue pill myth, Be Yourself. It’s the later material in the pickup world that’s more disturbing. Ultimately, pickup artists’ views of women are not based on the best sample, but on the small percentage of women on whom cheap tricks work. Since pickup artists are rarely able to achieve long-term, mutually enriching relationships, they deny their possibility. Run Game forever, they say. Never let your guard down, they say. Don’t be vulnerable, they say. All girls are basically the same, they say. It’s best not to listen to that shit. None of it’s true.

Pickup artistry doesn’t work, not as advertised. The high-pressure sales tactics that lead to quick lays will undermine genuine relationships. “Dread game” is abuse. Finally, having sex with a lot of different women never cures insecurity. Sex is amazing when it exists on its own, in the context of a loving relationship, but sex rarely solves problems. It does have a fascinating history of creating them, though.

Though the blue-pill lie ignores corruption, the red-pill lie exaggerates it, and advises one to manipulate it for personal benefit. This doesn’t work as most people hope, because few people get away with aggressive non-virtue for very long. Con artistry is a great way to get a one-night stand, and a shitty way to find relationships. In the long run, most people don’t find it fulfilling, men who indulge in pornified casual sex lose interest in “7/10” women, in the same way that porn addicts tire of vanilla scenes and gravitate toward the extreme, and obsess over the “9/10” they can never have.

It shouldn’t be surprising that men selling the secrets of how to con women into reluctant sex will also swindle men buying their services. They overpromise. Bed Models In 21 Days, only $26.99. Those who dip into these corrupt games find that they’re not winning enough, but the losers become enraged and disgusted. Despair sets in, and that’s what incels call the black pill.

Blue pillers view the world as just and indulge in hypocrisy. Red pillers view the world as corrupt and seek personal benefit, making the world a little worse with each move. Black pillers see the world as hopeless; it must be destroyed. That’s what produces the Elliot Rodgers and Alex Minassians.

When I was a redpilled guy trying to up my dating game, I learned about “negging”– an exaggerated refutation of the blue-pill notion that disingenuous compliments lead anywhere– and how to deal with those pesky interlopers called “AMOGs”. One learned how to play hot-and-cold games. I don’t like that I indulged in this, but the blackpill incel discussions of today’s world are worse: one finds martyr worship for murderers like Elliot Rodger, fantasies involving Westworld-esque sexbots, and female sexual slavery from the “pro” side of a debate that should not exist. These blackpilled men are, of course, deranged and need psychological help. I doubt many of them, in a country without universal healthcare, will get it.

Red-pill pickup artistry, at least, had better exit options than black-pill incel rage. In the mid-2000s, I used cheap tricks to get dates and make-out sessions, and to improve my confidence. It may have improved my life, though I doubt it. Eventually, with enough dating and relationship experience, I learned (spoiler alert) that women are people. Even when women I dated rejected me, they didn’t seem like terrible people; they were only quicker to perceive that it wouldn’t work out. Successes kept me going: the odds are always low, but the payoff is high.

With black-pill misery, though, there seems to be no exit. If I believed I lived in the world that these guys think is the real world, I’d be just as enraged. See, they believe that all women secretly want to sleep with their high school bullies, mythologized as “Chad”. In their view, romantic relationships are impossible, because they’ve used stunted male sexuality for their model of the adult female. Women who show genuine sexual interest in non-Chads, they believe, are settling for a “betabux” provider and, like a cat in heat, will do anything to get alpha sperm when she’s ready to have children. The red pill turned men into pickup artists; the black pill is turning them into suicides or, worse yet, murderers.

Most cults have an eschatological narrative, because cultish behavior is unsustainable and therefore the world’s imminent end must be, at least, wished-for. The recent turns in male grievance culture show us belief in a post-apocalyptic landscape. It says that women like their mothers and grandmothers no longer exist. It says that today, every “Stacy” has been fucked by 100 Chads before age 15. Ask a blackpiller about adult sexuality, and you get a picture of junkyard animals fighting over scraps of meat, ten weeks after the end of the world.

Fuck the blue pill. Fuck the red pill. Especially fuck the black pill.

There is corruption in the world; it has always been there. But, it is rarely so hopeless as to merit nihilism and destruction (black pill) and one need not get involved and add to the corruption (red pill). Are there women so damaged that they’ll sleep with men who deploy cheap tricks? Of course there are. That doesn’t mean that one has to take part.

I advocate what I’d call, in response, the green pill: to acknowledge reality as it is, with no self-deception, but then to do the right thing, rather than the easy thing that everyone else seems to be doing, anyway. If the world’s dirty, be clean. Plant a fucking tree. This is the approach of the ancient cynic or stoic, whose wisdom has not decayed with age. Don’t support women’s rights because you think it’ll get you laid (it might, or it might not); support women’s rights because it’s the moral thing to do.

In our might-makes-right, corporatized society, the green pill isn’t fashionable. We see bad guys winning, all over the place. Our president bragged about (and, almost certainly, has actually committed) sexual assault, and still got elected. Am I really going to make a case for virtue– as an end in itself, with no expectation of reward– when corporate capitalism reigns and so many bad people seem to be winning? Yes.

No one tells young men this, but being male sucks from ages 18 to 23 for most people. Men have a higher sex drive than women their age, but also the women in that cohort are attractive to the full age range of men, whereas men in that group can barely attract their own counterparts. Women have all the options; men have lots of competition. It gets better for men as the years pass, but the male initiation period has never been a positive experience. I went through it as well. Most men do.

Here’s what I’ve learned. The sex I didn’t have at 17, 18, 19, 20, 21… never mattered. In the long run, whether one loses virginity at 16 versus 26 is unimportant. That said, what I do remember, and not in a good way, is how often I acted like an asshole. I’d be lying if I said I was fully over that.

The results of actions fade in importance over time; the actions themselves stick around in one’s mind, and a person has to live with them forever.

Perhaps that’s the strongest case I can make for virtue on its own. I don’t know that I need a stronger one.

 

The blue pill is the chauvalry of disingenuous “nice guys” in a patriarchal corporate system where sex is a reward for good male behavior, rather than an immensely pleasurable expression of deep love. Blue pillers are just-worlders who go to work and believe their companies are “meritocracies”. Red pillers are men who’ve internalized how capitalism’s alpha males actually behave– they’ll lie, cheat, and steal to glamorize themselves– and apply it to sexuality. The black pill prescribes aggressive nihilism– humanity is hopeless; best to kill everyone. None of these are virtuous attitudes, and they’re all expressions of our right-wing corporate society. I advocate something else entirely: let’s be honest with ourselves about the world’s corruption– and fix it.

Why the Black Pill’s So Relevant

Red- and black-pill thinking, two branches of the male grievance culture, have always existed, but the red pill was always much more prevalent. People would rather believe they can manipulate their way to a better life than convince themselves that they’re terminally fucked (or the lack thereof). When I was taken in by the male grievance cult, wannabe pickup artists were common and no one identified as a permanent incel, or discussed murdering innocent people (as Rodger, Cruz, and Minassian have) to prove one’s point. So what changed? I’m going to borrow a dumb 1990s catchphrase: “It’s the Economy, Stupid.”

Back in my day, when we walked uphill (both ways) nine miles through the snow (now get off my lawn) we had something that doesn’t exist anymore: a functioning labor market. As I said, it has always been difficult to be an 18- to 23-year-old man– the supply/demand imbalances leave a lot of young men single. But, there were other things to do than stew about not getting laid. Let me explain how the whole “work” think used to work.

In the 1970s, a college degree and a car was all it took to talk your way on to a job– if you were 27 or older, a management job; if you were 32 or older, an executive job– anywhere in the country. So, what did you do, if you were a decent 22-year-old who couldn’t get laid? You worked, because these things called “careers” existed back then, and because if you actually showed up on time at your job and were still working at 1:30 in the afternoon, you’d be flying business-class by age 35 and running a company by your mid-40s. If you were what is now called an incel– back then, we just called it “not getting laid”– you could invest time and energy at work and distract yourself from the sex you weren’t having. That economic world doesn’t exist anymore; the 1% took it away from us. Thanks to offshoring and automation, the only thing left to do in the corporate world, except for those born into elite connections, is subordinate make-work with no career value, creative fulfillment, or redeeming social value.

It shouldn’t be surprising that our society would be throat-deep in a dangerous masculine crisis. Work sucks for women as much as it does for men– actually, it sucks even more for them– but men have been told for hundreds of years to identify themselves with their paid work, and that success in business is the ultimate expression of masculinity. With corporate consolidation and an imploded job market– one that hasn’t recovered from any of recessions we’ve had since 1973, although the stock market has and property prices are sky-high– this setup has produced an untenable situation where men are told that masculinity is to be found by… subordinating to other men. Of course the system would collapse. Ex falso quodlibet.

When I was an unsuccessful 22-year-old man, in 2005, I said a lot of shit that I now regret, but I held out hope (and was right) that my lack of social and sexual success was transient. The difference, in the post-2008 world, where housing is unaffordable in places where there are jobs, and where third-world corruption has become the norm in the “lean” private sector company, is that “incel” now stands as a permanent identity. Not knowing it, young people have conflated their permanent (unless we overthrow corporate capitalism) economic misery with their transient socio-sexual difficulties and become hopeless black-pillers. I don’t blame this on the women who are exercising their right to turn down men; I blame this on the 1% for stealing everything– for wrecking our economy and culture, and for perpetuating the simmering (blue pill, mostly) misogyny that makes these rages possible. The Elliot Rodgers of the world are like Japan’s hikikomori, but with the misogyny of an emerging fascist movement, and (scariest most) the guns of America.

So what are we going to do about it? We must overthrow corporate capitalism– a might-makes-right system of cancerous masculinity– before its corruption spreads further and the masculine crisis becomes an all-out war. We need to overthrow the red-pill corporate executives– the ones who perpetuate corruption for personal benefit– and the blue-pill establishment enablers, before this black-pill psychosis can fester and its shit really hits the fan.

In the Meantime

Angry young men such as today’s incels do not tend to believe facts put in front of them. If they listen to reason, they’ll still find their way to extreme interpretations. It’s very hard to change a mind in the moment. That doesn’t mean one shouldn’t blast bad ideas. People will eventually come around. It’s good to plant the good ones, even knowing they’ll be rejected at the time.

I’ve argued for feminism with incels. What these men don’t realize yet (and won’t be convinced any time soon, but there’s hope) is that feminism is actually good for the decent man, the “beta male” who’d rather play with his own kids than do 3 extra hours of work for a company that poisons someone else’s kids in Brazil. When I explain why feminism’s good for average beta males like me, the reaction tends to be either “well, obviously” (from the leftist progressives) or shock (from the zero-sum-thinking incels). Either way, here me out.

The incels have mythologized their high-school bullies, with a bit of male porn actor thrown in, as “Chad Thundercock”, the priapic Norse god of white male douchebaggery. The rest of us just call this loathsome creature “frat boy” or “bro”. The thing is, Chad is the guy who wins out under misogynistic structures like corporate capitalism. In societies where women’s fathers and economic forces parcel women out as a sexual commodity, Chads rule. Meanwhile, the more feminist a society is, the better results will come to the patient, caring, and less-macho men that women are more likely to choose– because they’re better fathers and far superior lovers than the Chads.

Incels tend to come, I’d guess, from the earnest lower-middle-class– the ones who once believed in all-American mythologies about corporate meritocracy, and who bought into the blue pill worldview– so they have a sense that the men women choose when directed by economic forces (or, better yet, economic necessity) are somehow superior to the brutish or monstrous men– there may be racial attitudes here– that women will choose if left to their own devices. There’s no evidence that bears that out, though.

Some women, of course, choose skid-row rotten men, just as vice versa. To the extent that there is a “Chad pattern” in some women, I think it comes from our puritanical attitudes about sex (paradoxically?) more than anything else. Tell young girls that sex is a disgusting thing, and they’ll do it with disgusting men: the abusive frat boys of the world.

There is one painful but beneficial result of feminism for men: we get rejected more. They have more options life. It may be counterintuitive, but all this rejection is a good thing. In the long term, relationships are symmetric: a marriage that’s good for one person is good for the other. Women are choosier not because they’re mean, but because they’re quicker to perceive mutual non-matches, while men are prone to “we can make it work” quixotry. Female choosiness, in the end, saves us time and emotional energy. A polite, respectful turn-down is a favor.

Why does rejection hurt so much, then? My guess is that it has to do with our evolutionary environment: small tribes of about 100 people. In such a small world, being rejected means being humiliated in front of all of one’s whole social world. Rejection and breakups feel like major, life-ending events because, twenty thousand years ago, they were pretty close to it.

In a world with 4 billion sexually active adults, though, rejection is harmless. You can get rejected 300 times and nothing bad happens. Our society is capable of discovering exceptional matches that would never have been found decades ago– I grew up in Appalachia, my wife grew up in the Philippines, and we met in New York– but the price of this is an ultra-high rejection rate.

Under the old patriarchal systems, women were pushed into marriage because they needed economic security, and as a way for their families to improve their social standing or achieve political goals. Love was optional, and long-term marital love seems to have been the exception rather than the rule. True, middle-class (and above) men were assured wives and the loss of their virginity, but “dead bedrooms” were pretty common after the baby-making stage ended.

Although lasting romantic love was the hoped-for marital ideal, it didn’t happen often in the old world that incels seem to want to return to. Old-style family sitcoms where the goofy dad always wants (and almost never gets) sex once seemed that’s-life funny and now, from a 2018 perspective, seem pathetic. Perhaps this is a cultural change more than one in reality, but when I look at the Everybody Loves Raymond marriage and its lost sexual chemistry, it’s not what I think people want, or will settle for. Feminism is forcing men to up their play if they want to get married, and almost everyone seems to be winning.

In sum on this matter, pairings that can generate long-term romantic love– the kind where a couple still want to jump each other’s bones after 10 years of marriage– are rare, and female choice isn’t 100% accurate in finding them, but it seems to be doing a better job than corporate patriarchy (“take it from your father: this boy’ll be a good provider.”)

It seems counterintuitive that heterosexual female choosiness– a source of extreme frustration in the short term– would lead to benefits for heterosexual men. If we accept though that relational health is, in the long term, mostly symmetric, it shouldn’t surprise us that much.

This would require another essay to explore, but I call it the Control Paradox. Relinquishing control can lead to better results, especially when that control is illusory. What’s magical about mature female sexuality, from a male perspective, is that it can’t be controlled. Nothing’s better than a woman going after what she wants.

Our economic system is brittle– corporate capitalism is breaking down already, and will probably shatter in the next fifty years– in the face of control paradoxes. See, we work in firms built on zero-sum thinking. The Graeberian bullshit jobs exist largely because corporate executives believe their subordinates’ happiness equals their misery. The more (stereotypically, at least) feminine open allocation approach to corporate governance results in more innovation than toxically masculine zero-sum command-and-control regimes… but the working world hasn’t learned that, and won’t until corporate capitalism has been overthrown.

It’s extremely counterintuitive that a system where men get rejected far more than ever before would be, in truth, better than all those other mating regimes we’ve discarded. The teens and early 20s are absolutely brutal. But here are things becoming rarer: divorce, loveless marriages, infidelity, and dead bedrooms. It’s sometimes amazing to me that, after all the rejection and false starts and misbehavior (on male and female sides) that I endured, I ended up getting what I wanted all along: marriage to the best woman, at least for me, I’ve ever met.

In Sum

When the blue-pill, politically correct, lies fall away, it’s a vulnerable moment for any man– much like what we are all going through as corporate capitalism’s total failure reaches a point we can’t ignore. Red-pill contempt and black-pill despair can set in, but I’d like to make the case for something else: to acknowledge the world’s corruption, without self-deception or undue negative emotion (for emotions themselves are useful data, but not recreation). I’d like to argue for the green pill: to do, in the face of corruption, the one thing that’s truly rebellious: to be better than that.

Nine Selves and the Hero’s Journey

Staged models of human development occur throughout philosophy, psychology, and religion. Kierkegaard said we were aesthetic, then ethical, then religious. Piaget focused on a child’s cognitive development. Freud gave us the terminology of “oral fixation” and “anal retention” as he mapped out his own psychosexual theory. Kohlberg focused on moral development. Timothy Leary put forward an 8-circuit model of consciousness that, while a bit loopy, inspired a lot of future work. I’m not smarter than these guys, and I’m not a trained psychologist, but looking through their work as well as my own experiences, I’ve come to the conclusion that there are about nine stages of consciousness, or nine selves, if you will.

Leary’s model connected specific circuits to drugs and argued that psychoactive chemicals like sugar (oral; 1st circuit), alcohol (2nd circuit), cannabis (5th circuit), and ketamine (8th circuit) were literal neurotransmitters; today, we know that to be false. Moreover, experiences do not impact us on only one of the circuit (e.g., “a 4th circuit” experience) and I suspect that all circuits or selves or stages exist, to some degree, in adults. Like the higher harmonics on a musical instrument, they’re all there, just in varying amounts.

I don’t have the biological knowledge necessary to defend the term “circuit”, either, so I’ll use the looser term of “self”. I don’t intend this to be a rigorous scientific model– I don’t know how one would test it– but it’s a meta-analytical tool I find useful.

I posit that there are (at least) nine selves that unlock during a person’s development. The first three– sensory, positional, and cognitive– emerge during childhood and seem to be universal in terms of how they are interpreted and the ages at which they seem to emerge: birth, age 2, and about 4.

The middle three– socio-sexual, aesthetic, and truth-seeking– emerge in adulthood, and tend to correspond most strongly to adolescence, middle age, and elderhood. Unlike the first three stages, these do not emerge by necessity with age; a cognitive self emerges in almost everyone, but there are many older adults for whom the socio-sexual self still dominates.

The last three– self-revealing, supremely vulnerable, and meta-mortal– tend to occur in mystical experiences, and are the hardest to describe. These tend toward the speculative, since we really don’t know, in any scientific sense, whether there is a why to conscious experience, or what really occurs to us after we die. Experiences involving these final three selves tend to leave people with strong sensations of divinity or an afterlife– or, perhaps, an absence thereof– but. on these topics, present science tells us little either way.

1. The Sensory Self (Infants and Cells)

In the first two years of life, we’re a helpless animal. In fact, we’re lower in functionality than animals, since we can’t survive on our own, which most creatures can. None of us remember this stage, which has historically led to incorrect notions about it. We used to think an infant’s vision is blurry, our own memories of childhood being so blurred– that’s incorrect. Still, there doesn’t seem to be much more going on in a baby than in any other organism: sensors and movement.

The sensory self dominates infancy. It doesn’t go away with age; we just develop, as we age, the tools to understand what it is doing to us. We have some ability to moderate its influence, but not as much as we’d think. Hunger, extreme cold or heat, or physical pain dominate us at a certain point; if they are intense enough, the other selves are muted. Lower selves, except possibly in people who’ve mastered self-disciplines often considered spiritual (e.g., the yogi’s ability to bear intense pain), can override the higher ones, and that’s not a bad thing. It keeps us alive, that these lower selves “break through” in desperate situations.

We can idealize maturation or spiritual progress by assuming circuits to be “complete”; for example, most of us don’t spend much time on the sensory self’s concerns. Our brains do a lot of work– as someone who’s worked on AI programming, I can say: it is a lot of work– to regulate breathing and balance, and the visual processing our eyes and brains do is fascinating, but most of us can rely on the sensory self without thinking about it.

Yet, as someone who experiences anxiety and depression, I’m aware that the lower selves can get out of whack. Just as all selves are activated by complex experience, they are all connected and can all be thrown out of whack by disorder.

The sensory self is best at ease when one feels cozy and safe: drinking a warm cup of coffee on a winter day; or sleeping in late; or relief when pain subsides. However, chronic pain as well as dysfunction of the next self “up”– the positional self– can lead it to disorder: lethargic depression. When the sensory self is unhappy– possibly due to overload from the demands of its siblings, e.g., after the positional self throws a panic tantrum– the body feels heavy and one wants to do… as little as possible. To burrow into the warm folds of the earth and sleep, perhaps forever. This may be the only self that doesn’t get bored.

2. The Positional Self (Toddlers and Lobsters)

Leary, I think, got it right when he said that the toddler self– the positional self, as I call it– is one whose dysfunctions are activated by alcohol. The positional self’s unresolved issues come out roaring when a person’s drunk. He named it the emotional circuit, and with that I disagree; we feel emotions on all the circuits. This is where what we might call our “lower” emotions live: anger, fear, triumph, and disgust.

The sensory self seeks nourishment and comfort; it avoids pain, and though it does not know why, it avoids senses that evince danger: loud noises, pungent odors, extreme temperatures. It reacts; it wants to be safe.

The positional self emerged, most likely, along with complex organisms, sexual reproduction, and competition for resources with other creatures (including conspecific ones). Dominance hierarchies exist, and Jordan Peterson argues that they go back to lobsters, and the positional self develops as we realize that conspecific individuals are a source of danger.

It’s traumatic, when this happens: the first bite of fruit, perhaps, from the Tree of Knowledge. We become envious of adults, who are seven times our size. We size each other up, too. We get envious of older, bigger children but also younger ones who get more attention. We stand halfway between that boring world of infant survival– reacting to things, being taken care of– and this complicated adult one that makes no sense to us. It’s also easy to punish us: to be yelled at is like physical pain, and a five-minute timeout or recess detention seems eternal. We haven’t separated physical pain and psychological emotion, so falling down and skinning a knee (which we do a lot) makes us cry, to an extent that an adult only would if someone died.

We get our first inklings of sickness and death in this age, though we don’t understand them fully. We learn that not all humans are good: some will kick us, just to hear us cry. We may even find ourselves doing such things– I was a bit of a bully, I’m afraid, and I’m far from proud of it– and not know why. We do a lot of terrible things (for which we feel later remorse, sometimes 15 seconds later and sometimes 15 years later) to test limits and see where we stand in the territorial and dominance structures that exist all around us.

This time becomes hazy in memory, the thoughts of that time rarely thought in words, more like a shuffled stack of postcards than a narrative. Higher selves emerge and we become smart enough to deal with it– most of the time. It always lives within us, though. People who are “bad drunks” usually have positional-self issues that come out when the higher selves are blunted with alcohol. The positional self doesn’t like being told to wait in line like everyone else, and it can’t stand to see a personal or professional rival driving a more expensive car than the perfectly fine one we have. Moreover, what is an open-plan office but an attempt to manipulate a worker via his positional self’s weaknesses?

The positional self’s dysfunction takes the form of anxiety, which everyone has; it runs the gamut from the low-grade fear that keeps us alive to a full-scale, debilitating panic attack that takes days to recover from: the sensory self, also beaten, falls into lethargy.

 

Alcohol can unveil existing issues in a person’s positional self, but almost anyone can develop positional-self dysfunctions. Low social position has that effect, especially if it leads to uncontrollable changes is a person’s environment.

Humans are, for the most part, resilient. We can go through a lot without lasting mental illness. Grief, after a parent dies, is normal, but few of us become total wrecks. Natural disasters, accidents, and life-threatening animal encounters can cause specific phobias, but rarely break the mind outright. What seems limitless in its capacity to destroy the human mind is not danger (in fact, we seek danger out) but stigma: not mere unsafeness but the kind that comes from low social position. For example, one of the few non-biological factors that seems to cause frank psychosis is eviction in childhood; moving and poverty are bad enough, but combine them into a constant chase, and it’s a disaster.

High social status, on the other hand, can induce or reveal the positional self’s dysfunction just as easily. Often, the positional self uses the tools of other, higher, selves to get what it wants. For example, the corporate executive shows some strength (in general, IQ between 120 and 130) in the cognitive self, and his motivations are usually socio-sexual, but his day-to-day behaviors are toddler-like. This is sometimes called “acquired situational narcissism” and it’s also common in promising artists, academics, and writers who get famous too young, too quickly, and turn into blithering idiots.

High-status positional upset also emerges in the sort of acquisitive sex addict that has unfortunately found a niche selling the skills that come from its glib social hypertrophy (“pickup artistry”) . These men, who have put themselves at the top of a certain hierarchy, go beyond normal socio-sexuality into positional obsession.

The positional self always wants more; to level up, to get to the top, to have the shiniest toys. If it wins, it wants a bigger win. If it loses, its impulse is to try again. You see this in socially inept men who continue to chase the same sort of woman– popular, self-involved– that rejected them in high school, while failing to develop adult tastes or expectations; they keep losing on “that damn level”; to them, it’s like a video game where they have to “beat that damn level”. Because they must win, they lose. Their insecurity is such a turn-off that even when these women “hit the wall”– a fantasy of such men in which aging reduces their socio-sexual value– it does them no good (and I’m not terribly sympathetic).

Our higher selves enable us to drop out of the positional nonsense– on reflection, most of it is absurd; there is nothing dangerous about being seventh in line at the grocery store– most of the time.

 

Now, it is often said that bullies (in the schoolyard or the workplace) are insecure and have low self-esteem, and that’s not accurate. I wish it were true; I wish bullies suffered as that narrative suggests; but, in truth, they tend to have high self-esteem, and while they are insecure in fact (since a monster is driving them that will not be satisfied until they have destroyed everything) they do not feel insecure in the moment.

This said, the bully’s ultimate destination is misery, since he’s feeding something that gets hungrier the more it is fed. We note here that the very poor and very rich are miserable for the same reason: their lives are all about money. The very-poor person deals with debt collectors; the very-rich person deals has hundreds of sudden “best friends” who’ll revolutionize parking garage technology and just need half a million to do it. It’s a not good life, one that’s all about money, and of course money isn’t evil (and neither is sex, which will cover later); the problem is with people.

It’s probable that all selves emerge, though in muted form, around age two; the toddler has enough of a cognitive self to acquire language, and a socio-sexual instinct to want to spend time with attractive people, even though those selves have yet to mature.

3. The Cognitive Self (Children and Primates)

It wouldn’t surprise me if humans reach peak rationality just before puberty. We’ve aged out of the toddler’s tantrums, but we haven’t yet developed a fixation– regressive, for many people– on sexuality. We can make jokes as equals to adults, recognizing the absurdity of the “selves” below and above this one: the positional squabbling of toddlers, the socio-sexual drama of teenagers and immature adults, and the Seinfeldian universality of these impulses even in mature, intelligent adults. The 10-year-old boy “gets it” that his 15-year-old sister’s obsession with makeup is a bit silly… until two or three years later, when he has his own similar nonsense.

Language develops earlier, but cognition becomes an end in itself in early childhood; the third self emerges. What was once a loosely connected set of concepts useful to the lower selves– “hot”, “cold”, “feed”, “me”– now has rules; the words have relationships. “I want milk” is less confusing than “milk me”.

In this self, humans differentiate vastly, not only from animals, but from each other. The lowest tier of cognitive behavior– unexamined motivations, rooted in the positional self’s wants– we liken to rodents, e.g. “the rat race”. The sociality we develop as children to please or disgust others– but not to manipulate them, since socio-sexual games haven’t begun yet– we liken either to dogs (pleasing) or pigs (disgusting). Next up, humor starts and we get a grasp of language and its limitations, tools and their unintended uses, and the ever-present terror of boredom. Primates have enough of this that we call a hyper-curious, humorous person “a monkey” Buddhists call the chattering, grasping, often internally verbal (as if it were explaining itself to someone) element of our minds “the monkey mind” and I find that apropos.

What differentiates us from animals is that our cognitive selves are much better. They are nearly limitless. Unlike every other animal, we hit a critical point, something akin to Turing completeness. We can reason about reasoning. We can dissect our own programs.

Plenty of animals can do quick cognitive feats we can’t; for example, a falcon can fly through dense forest at 100 miles per hour– we’d hit a tree and die, if in control. It is said that dogs solve partial differential equations (obviously, not consciously) when they catch a frisbee. Neither animal knows that 34 plus 55 equals 89; neither animal knows the basic concepts (or cares). We, however, can do anything, computationally speaking– the only limitation is that we can be slow. We can formulate problems that no amount of fault can solve. We have made ourselves an apex predator, but we’ve also learned that we will die, no matter what we do. That thing that the positional self tortures us in order to avoid will, one day, happen.

The cognitive self works in symbols like words, characters, and numbers. It lacks nuance, and while this is a social hindrance (that our next selves must overcome) it is from this that notions of mathematical and scientific precision have emerged.

There seem to be few limits to what can be done with the symbolic and cognitive self. It may not have taste– we’ll need to use the socio-sexual, aesthetic, and truth-seeking selves if we want to write novels or essays worth reading– but it gets the mechanics of communication down. Furthermore, this is where we start to see limitations. I suspect that my sensory and positional selves– the first a reactive agent, the second a bit of a mindless bully if left on his own– can do no more or less than anyone else’s. Some people are better at positional games than others, but because of differences in higher selves, it seems.

The symbolic self, though, can always do more than whatever it does. There are theorems in mathematics that have never been proven and that I’m not smart enough to prove. If we agree that a thing is either true or not true (excluded middle) then we cannot prove all things that are true (Gödel); we cannot tell whether two computational processes are equivalent (Church); there is no way to know if a program terminates (Turing); we cannot really know anything about an arbitrary computation (Rice); there are probably truths that are verifiable within minutes but that one could not derive with all the time and matter in the universe (the unsolved P ?= NP problem).

Above are formal results. Those apply to machines much faster than we are, and to anything we might call replicable intelligence. The part of us that thinks in symbols– of course, the brain does millions of other things– can handle no more than 100 symbols per second, even under the best-case assumptions. For raw computation, we’re way slower (and more error prone) than computers. In many ways, we’re limited, some of us much more than others.

Then, there are differences between us. In practice, the difference between an IQ 100 mind and IQ 80 is significant; that between IQ 120 and IQ 100 is notable; that between IQ 140 and IQ 120 is relevant in the most abstract academic disciplines, but in most of life immaterial. Measurable intelligence doesn’t tell us everything, but it tells us a lot. I don’t mean to be cruel– in fact, we should acknowledge that since intelligence isn’t chosen, the leftist impulse to moralize intellect is misguided– but only about 5% of the population can become professional mathematicians; the other 95%, no matter what they do, won’t make it. Furthermore, most of that 5% will require a lot of work to do it, just to be professionally adequate; and all of them will need to put forth substantial effort if they want to be significant mathematicians. Creativity is harder to measure, but true creativity seems at least as rare as high intelligence (with which it is not always correlated) and general creative superiority (at a substantial level) may not even exist. What differentiates creative people is a Drake equation of sorts, each specific to a given field; native measurable intelligence is rarely the most important factor.

Why couldn’t a person with a 100 IQ become a professional mathematician? Prima facie, it doesn’t seem impossible; people with 100 IQs can do most things that people with 140 IQs can do: they can run businesses, lead others, and learn most academic subjects if they really need to– and if they put in a lot of work. It just takes longer to learn them. In practice, though, limitations of time and resources make it very unlikely that it’ll ever happen. Society is unlikely to invest the resources (nor, the person himself) necessary to get a 100 IQ person to the fore in mathematics, even if it were theoretically possible. There are scientifically accomplished people with “low” (below 130, so not actually low) measured IQs, but even this is rare enough that one might question the tests rather than the notion of intelligence itself.

We sort ourselves into cognitive classes; we need to do so. Jordan Peterson talks about competence versus dominance hierarchies, and the distinction is relevant. If we don’t figure out who’s smart, then whoever is most forceful will end up in charge. There is a tendency for people who excel with their positional and socio-sexual selves to be deficient in their cognitive, aesthetic, and truth-seeking selves; this puts society at peril when the “strong man” wins.

Let’s talk about politics. As I don’t enjoy the leftist tendency to moralize intelligence– the attitude that people of average capability could be “like us” if they worked harder, which implies there is something wrong with them when they are not– and although basic income will be one of many needed tools in the future, I don’t think it’s enough to give people a sense of dignity. In any case, though it is necessary for us to have cognitive classes, this tendency of ours creates messes.

First, no one should live an inferior life because of low intelligence. It’s a bit inconsistent that we (rightly) view it as tasteless to spit on people with retardation (IQ 0–69) but have no problem trashing the merely “stupid” from 70 to 99. (I recognize that there is such a thing as elective moral stupidity– also known as ignorance– but that, my friends, occurs often in high-IQ people, too.) This said, our society is at a level of complexity that requires smart people to make the decisions. Preference aggregation (e.g., voting and market economies) serves two separate purposes. One is to make decisions; the other is to hold those in power accountable. The latter is why voting matters: an individual vote almost never sways an election; but, when a group can vote, politicians are more accountable to that group.

What do we want? Well, we want complex decisions to be made by a cognitive elite (based on skill and taste, as innate intelligence isn’t worth much on its own) but we need for people in that elite to be accountable to everyone else.

That, on its own, is a hard problem. How do we establish a cognitive elite that can make complex decisions quickly, without them becoming self-serving or unaccountable to those with less genetic fortune?

Worse, we’re not even at the point where that is our problem. Representative democracy is the purported solution, but it doesn’t always work that way. Business bureaucracies (which have become, in the past 50 years, more powerful and important than governments) don’t even try to come close.

The cognitive self may approach a child’s perfect rationality– smart, not yet corrupted by socio-sexual impulses– but it also has the child’s timidity. The selves just below and above it dominate the culture. Those who master positional dynamics run the business world. The socio-sexual winners become the in-crowd and run the culture. We have a rapacious toddler elite running us from the economic right; we have a self-involved adolescent elite running us from the cultural left.

Beyond this, one questions whether it is beneficial to be supremely cognitive provides real merit. There are millions of math problems one could solve, or books one could write, or pieces of music one could compose; which ones matter? We have to peer into the higher selves to find a why for all this glucose- or electricity-consuming cognition.

One could, in principle, ask whether the middle digit of the 10237th prime is even or odd. (Pedant note: if the number’s length is even, break the tie at left.) In every universe, the answer is the same. It would take eons to answer this (from what we know now) and there seems to be no purpose in doing so.

I mentioned that dysfunction and irresolution of the sensory self seems to be a lethargic depression. In the positional self, it’s anxiety. In the cognitive self, it’s obsession. One can see the downward cascade of dysfunction, I’d imagine: obsession often leads to anxiety, which can spill over into lethargic depression.

4. The Socio-Sexual Self (Adolescence)

Sexuality exists in most creatures, but socio-sexuality seems limited to the most advanced animals: humans, cetaceans, and primates. Sex becomes a tool to avoid conflict– two same-sex conspecifics might prefer each other, rather than fighting over a mate– and to build intense relationships of trust (notably, pair bonding).

In less advanced animals, sexuality seems to occur as-needed, in response to a drive that only wells up on occasion– because sex is dangerous, and nature built animals to take as few unnecessary risks as possible. This is why it’s not cruel to neuter pets; sex is not something they always want or see as a necessary part of life. It’s something they get an irritating, dangerous drive to do on occasion.

Socio-sexuality re-introduces the irrationality that the cognitive self tried to stifle. When we’re 11, we find it ridiculous that a 16-year-old would react so strongly to a transient facial blemish. Our intelligence is not refined at 11, but we may be at our most rational. At that age, we are on the younger “mountains are mountains” side of the socio-sexual drama on most television; we see the humor in people acting absurd but lack the experience to understand their motivations.

Socio-sexuality hits us like a wrecking ball. I don’t think animals, except when in heat, care much about sex. In general, most mammals aren’t choosy. Two males might fight over a female, but the female would be happy to go off with either one (or a third male who is smart enough to come after the fight starts, and not fight at all). Humans are, and it’s this choosiness (in both of the main genders, despite stereotypes) that leads us to take a renewed interest in social hierarchies.

The socio-sexual self can be nasty: it understands the lower selves and can use them, in a person and in others. It can combine the primal meanness of the positional self with the infinite calculation of the human cognitive self to devise all kinds of creative punishments: even non-physical ones (induced depression, ostracism) that leave no marks. Almost every animal fights; the socio-sexual self, however, can come up with torture. It can lead the cognitive self on a chain; it can make a smart person wrong in hyper-intelligent ways that even she is not smart enough to think her way out of; that “four-wheel drive” problem of getting stuck in inaccessible places.

Though I suspect that the higher animals have flickers of socio-sexuality, it dominates humans. Quite a few people reach this level of maturity and stop. The positional and cognitive selves give them methods to go about the world; the socio-sexual self gives them motivation; it’s the why. The cognitive self learns that paper pictures of dead people are a fantastic way to acquire needed things without positional conflict; the socio-sexual self falls so far in love with dead-people-paper (and the sexual access it provides) that it’ll destroy the whole world, just to acquire more.

Socio-sexuality is also where genders diverge most. This is probably socially constructed. The sensory, positional, and cognitive selves seem very similar, despite society’s differing reactions to each. Socio-sexuality is gendered.

The toddler realizes, to great fear, that not all humans are friendly and that an authority/status ranking, as well as an obvious size/strength/can-kill-you ranking, exist– and that they’re at the bottom of both. The cognitive self provides distraction and a quest for self-improvement, and it is perhaps for this reason that cognitively under-satisfied (i.e., bored) children fall into positional agony. Cognition is an end of its own for a while, until we experience intense impulses (often negative ones, often ones we know we can’t act on) and start to wonder what we are cogitating toward. We are bigger and stronger and (unlike toddlers) starting to be sexually appealing; we can climb those hierarchies now… maybe?

Those hierarchies traumatized us at 2; we threw tantrums when we learned that we couldn’t just take candy from the store. From 3 to 11 or so, we decided that adult stuff was not only not for us, but seemed a lot more boring than reading, writing, running around outside, trying to hit a road sign with a slingshot. Then, we’re 12, and we want to climb those adult hierarchies… but we’re absolutely pathetic as adults. We still need guidance. Gendered socialization seems to come in. Boys are usually told to resolve this re-emergent positional trauma by keeping with the cognitive stuff: gain skills and competencies, learn how to survive, learn how to defend others. Girls are told they are beautiful (or, in some sad cases, not) based on their innate traits. Even into adulthood, society seems to rate men based on what they do and women based on what (it thinks) they are. This is why there can be a celebrity “It girl” but never an “It guy”.

The masculine regime seems harsher: who wouldn’t rather be than have to do, to earn one’s keep? In some ways it is. For one: it’s punishing in adolescence. 20-year-old women are beautiful (not to say older women aren’t) but the vast majority of 20-year-old men haven’t accomplished a damn thing; they can’t do much at all. It forces men to learn and demonstrate a set of domain-specific (and somewhat icky) social skills (“game”) that women don’t need if they’re even average looking. Yet, in most societies, the feminine regime is a lot more repressive. Why? Forget the idealized societal notion of valuing women for what they are as opposed to men for what they do. Society will get a woman’s (or a man’s) what-you-are (reputation) wrong and not care; sometimes it’s deliberate, extortive, or even malevolent. Men suffer from this but, in most societies, women suffer more.

Socio-sexuality brings the old positional dreads back, in men and women. We men realize that some are more competent (in athletics, or in academics, or in the slimy reptilian positional game of real-world “work”) than we’ll ever be. Women realize that some women are more beautiful. We do resolve this, later on: self-definition. We drop out of “the Great Game” and find a game we can win. .

Middle school, in the U.S., seems to be the worst. There is one hierarchy and everyone wants to know where they stand. I remember estimating my popularity, at age 12, by drawing names from the yearbook and taking a weighted average (based on other peoples’ popularity, as I guessed) of how much (I thought) they liked me. Basically, I invented PageRank before Google, though I only did one iteration, because I didn’t know what eigenvectors were and my programming skills were limited to QBasic. And, of course, the numbers were made up and probably wrong. Still, middle school is a time where there’s one popularity hierarchy and everyone has a position on it.

In high school, people diverge. One can have value without playing the terrifying Great Game (to use Tyrion Lannister’s phrase) and do something else. Bad at football? Play chess. Or learn a musical instrument. That won’t get you laid in high school, but it’ll get you respected, and (they tell you… haha) it’ll get you laid in college.

Socio-sexual ranking systems affect our self-image much more than a purely positional ranking. We know that positional rankings are volatile and dangerous. If an idiot with a sharp piece of metal (e.g., a knife) comes at me, demanding my wallet, he outranks me in the moment (being able to end my earthly existence) and I will give it. I’ll be shaken, I’m sure, but I’m not going to think less of myself for giving the wallet up. Socio-sexual rankings, on the other hand, impress memories. Worse yet, they generate feedback loops that can be impossible to get out of. A person with poor grades for three years is unlikely to get into an elite college with a senior-year turnaround; a 25-year-old male virgin is unattractive, for that reason alone, to most women his age; disliked or low-ranking people are excluded from future opportunities.

So, when the One Hierarchy of middle school fades, as the high schoolers develop cliques, that’s actually a good thing. People whose physical features are unattractive to most can often find partners who seek those traits out. We decide what we value and what we don’t; this is why adolescence is a time with the strongest focus on self-definition and expression. Even if we are not globally remarkable, we can be unique and un-rankable.

Unfortunately, this dissembling only goes so far. We see some of it in high school, and more in college, but then when we leave college… a new One Hierarchy emerges: money. We’re on the bottom, mostly. Whether we want to be or not, we’re back in the Great Game with everyone. To make it even worse, it’s a rigged Great Game; undeserving rich kids, whom we defeated in academic competitions where their parents couldn’t buy scores, rocket to the top of the corporate world. People of merit, meanwhile, get stuck trying to figure out what the fuck happened.

College, in terms of the message it sends to young people, is a lie. It implodes in late adolescence and it’s painful. It gives 25 percent of the population a leadership education, for which it charges them an immense price, while failing to divulge that only 1 percent of them will get leadership positions (and that those were mostly pre-selected at birth).

Here’s how I’ve come to view it. Society creates “cells” within which intellectual merit– talent and hard work– matter. Middle class kids who go to Harvard are one cell; the blue-blooded kids who got in with 1250 SATs because “we’ve gone here for generations” are in a different cell, even though they attend the same university. Minority students at elite colleges often end up in their own cells and this is called “self-segregation”, though I’m afraid it’s not entirely elective. At any rate, at age 21, we are maximally invested in the value system of our cell and ranked according to what we value: one might be the #3 physics major but the best in the lab; or a mediocre student but an excellent poet.

When college ends, most of us go into the working world– graduate school is another topic, for another time, but not all that different– and all those cell walls dissolve, and the shuffling continues, and most of us are back around what could have been predicted when we were born, and we don’t know what happened. We learn then that the animalistic positional nonsense never went away. Uh, oops.

There’s one place on a college campus where the terrible old world– ancient, vicious impulses and desires– breaks through: “hookup culture”, which is a polite term for an acquisitive, alcohol-fueled, and combative sexuality that leaves everyone but sociopaths dissatisfied. Men struggle to get sex; women get sex easily but struggle just as hard as men to get respect. It leads to “rape culture”. Right-wing psychopathy (though it is apolitical and for historical reasons associated with the left) tears a hole in the college utopia’s walls, and the miasma breaks through.

At least, for that, one can opt out. The depiction of college life suggests that dystopian casual socio-sexuality is the norm on campuses, but here’s the good news: it’s a few loud (and usually quite damaged) people making most of the noise. Pair bonding and healthy monogamous relationships are still very much “in”; they never went away.

The common currencies of American society seem to be socio-sexual. We work to rank ourselves; when young, so we can fuck more; when colder, so our little fuck-trophies can get into better schools than others’ little fuck-trophies, and grow up to be executives who boss around others’ now-adult fuck-trophies, and then go on to send their own little fuck-trophies (fuck-trophies of fuck-trophies) to better schools so… you get the point.

It’s an ugly thing to realize, that this is the heartbeat of commercial life. It’s not that sex is bad. Of course, it’s not. The zero-sum socio-sexuality that seems to live in human society is disgusting; sex itself isn’t disgusting at all.

We could do so much better. Sex isn’t a zero-sum commodity, after all. Economic inequality causes rich and poor people both to have less sex (and to have less stable sexual relationships)– some overwork themselves, while those in low positions lose desire. A few people’s unresolved (and perhaps infinite) socio-sexual desires have created a dismal society that’s obsessed with sex but, in fact, has little of it.

I believe that many European societies have progressed into the next phase of maturation, while the U.S. fumbles about in an adolescence that lasts too long.

I mentioned the failure modes of the lower selves; lethargy, for the sensory self; anxiety, for the positional self; obsession, for the cognitive self. What does failure in the socio-sexual self look like? There are two kinds that seem different, but might be similar; ill-gotten or perverse socio-sexual success leads to narcissism. Socio-sexual failure leads to a form of depression that’s higher-functioning but more profound than lethargy: despair. Lethargic depression (e.g., after a panic attack or illness) comes from defeat; despair and dread linger when defeat continues without respite.

Most of us, thank God, do not live in socio-sexual defeat forever. We learn how to relate to other people, we better ourselves, we start dating, we get married. We move on from socio-sexual squabbles and start asking deeper questions: what is the good life?

Most of us are capable of formulating that question. It’s only an artifact of how our society’s constructed, in the U.S., that has us answering to the avaricious, perennially socio-sexually irresolute, tasteless and unethical (i.e., lacking the aesthetic and truth-seeking selves) half-men that become corporate executives. We should become more like Europe, cast those executives aside, and dedicate our lives to things that really matter.

4B. Aside on Corporate Misery and Conflict Between the Socio-Sexual and Aesthetic Worlds.

Growing old is mandatory; growing up is optional. I obviously am not the first to say this, but it applies here. Quite a large number of people never develop the fifth (aesthetic) or sixth (truth-seeking) self, much less the higher ones.

Most of us grow out of the socio-sexual contest. Why? Because, after 30, it’s not hard to “get sex”. One can pay for it. An average-looking (or even below-average-looking) person has typically developed the social skills necessary to find casual hookups. Or, one can go a more traditional route: get married.

Furthermore, most people learn either through direct experience or others’ tales that the socio-sexual hierarchy is bunk, at least as a predictor of the quality of an experience. Or, to put it bluntly: most people at its apex (in both genders) are too selfish to be decent lovers. Emotional intimacy matters so much more than socio-sexual ranking; people realize that and say: to hell with the latter. Thus, they enter full adulthood.

So why would a person, now married and 30 years old, care about the Great Game at all?

Well, we still need this stupid little thing, a socio-sexual token called “a job”, to have an income. That’s non-negotiable for most of us. If we have children, we need to line up schools and connections and (in today’s world) first jobs to keep them from falling into society’s blender blades.

So, we end up contending with socio-sexual machinery that other people created and that has no value. We have to go to work, and most of us do that in the corporate world.

The dismal socio-sexuality of the workplace could merit its own 10,000-word essay: how it is aggressively patriarchal and heterosexual, even when run by women or gay people; how it sublimates male bisexuality into homosadism, with executives inclined to abuse men because they are ashamed of their sexual feelings for them; and, finally, how it has emasculated high-performing men by forcing them to contend with harem dynamics.

The main issue I’ll cover is this. Most of us, by 30 if not before, have settled down into a life where sexuality is (as is much preferred, thank you) a private matter. It’s distasteful to talk about one’s sex life, if one is supposed to be having sex with only one person. Public socio-sexuality becomes a bit shameful. It probably should be. What good did it ever do? Sex is a good thing; socio-sexuality? Not so much.

I disagree with those who attribute all creativity to sublimated sexuality. The best creativity comes from all of the selves: aesthetic and truth-seeking as well. This said, the crass minuscule creativity of the corporate world– the approval-seeking, inoffensive humor; the slight variations on sickening conformity that somehow stand out– is probably socio-sexual in its origins.

One thing about the corporate workplace that makes it so hostile to life is that, while it professes to be a cognitive hierarchy, it is a weird hybrid of a positional and socio-sexual hierarchy. Let’s focus on the socio-sexual component first: the people at the top are effete half-men, exhausted by decades of subordination, humiliation, creative atrophy, and idiocy. One cannot exceed them in creativity and survive, although they have so little creativity– note the irony, in that the self-appointed socio-sexual winners are obese, self-indulgent men with broken families– that self-deletion is often the only viable approach. On its own socio-sexual terms, the corporate world is a miasma of failure.

The corporate world has no aesthetic merits: it’s aggressively tasteless. It has no truth-seeking value: it actively works to destroy truth, lest it disturb the lies that prop it up. It does not have much cognitive merit– smart people do not succeed in it. Yet, when the supposed socio-sexual winners are effete, obese half-men whose families despise them, it’s hard to swallow that component either. What’s left, to dominate daily activity, is positional nonsense: open-plan offices and status checks and pointless deadlines– psychiatric warfare to remind the arbitrarily unfortunate that the arbitrarily fortunate people in charge, are in charge.

 

5. The Aesthetic Self (Maturity; the Artist)

We’re supposed to realize that there’s more to life than incessant competition. Most of us do, especially when we lose at rigged competitions over and over. We grow to value experiences more than possessions, and processes rather than results.

We might paint or write something, sell it to no one, or even destroy it.

The aesthetic self can be selfish, or it can be altruistic, but it seems to the be the first self that considers other people for its own reasons. We learn, much earlier with our positional self, to be “nice” to avoid punishment, and we develop finer social skills to ascend socio-sexual hierarchies, but we learn in adulthood that beautiful experiences can have more value– or, at least, a different kind of value– when shared.

True beauty– the first crack of snowy air in November, the first kiss with a new lover– is often fleeting. If you stare at it, it’s gone, just as any word becomes absurd if you repeat it a million times in your head. The only long-term strategy for achieving consistent beauty (as opposed to boring, repetitive indulgence) is to work to give beautiful experiences to others. The aesthetic self seeks the profound and eternal; it also seeks intimacy in the now.

The aesthetic self isn’t always a wondrous or virtuous thing. It can be repugnant, depending on what it finds beautiful. De Sade, I would surmise, found others’ misery and humiliation to be beautiful. The aesthetic self’s tolerance for discomfort can lead it to cause pain for others, too. It would probably steal another airline passenger’s first-class ticket to avoid the unpleasantness of coach, if it could get away with it.

The traditional result of sex is children, and few experiences are so profound as those involving kids. This is good and bad. The aesthetic self drives adults (some of them, anyway) to care about their kids and want positive experiences– and, one imagines, a good life– for them. But there’s much evil that comes from private child-raising, too. The intense bonds people feel with their own progeny– and, often, something on the spectrum between apathy and competitive rivalry toward other’s children– are, no doubt, a driving force behind the proto-fascist nightmare we call “Corporate America”.

One of the deepest dysfunctions of the aesthetic self occurs in the world of recreational drug use. I’m not talking about addiction here, because addiction crushes all selves. LSD, cannabis, and psilocybin are not addictive, and they’re not the evil terror drugs they’re made out to be. (They are dangerous, but the probability of long-term psychiatric casualty from one-time use is probably closer to 1-in-100 than what mainstream society seems to think.) Yet, I’ve seen users of these drugs get wrapped up in “experience chasing”. There’s no physical addiction, but they have to have the next bigger and more powerful experience, to trip harder and longer than they ever have before. It becomes a form of escapism.

Toward the end of that, the psychonaut-cum-burnout has usually been hospitalized at least once, and is likely to suffer panic attacks and HPPD, at which point the drug of abuse is often alcohol– possibly self-medication for acquired anxiety. Alcoholism is never good, but when it’s combined with the medicines one needs to manage panic attacks, it can be fatal.

The aesthetic self’s limitations should be known. Immediate pleasure isn’t always wanted. I don’t know from experience whether heroin is pleasurable (having never done it) but the reasons not to do it are obvious.

This said, the aesthetic self isn’t bad on its own. Religious anti-hedonism is, and we should be thankful for this, dying out. Beauty, joy, and love are what the aesthetic self seeks. The child experiences them but does not know why; the adult has more of a sense of where to find them.

To all of our chagrin, beautiful experiences are rare. There is so much ugliness in the world, and most of it’s unnecessary. Most people spend fifty weeks on pointless, subordinate activity in order to enjoy two weeks of vacation (that they don’t much enjoy because they’re just “recovering”). We live in a world where dysfunction of the aesthetic self– tastelessness– is the norm.

There’s another issue. The first three selves are gender-neutral. Male or female, we all have senses, we’re all animals, we all use the same words. The socio-sexual self incorporates gender into its identity, almost by definition. The aesthetic self need not be gendered, but in our society, it’s treated as feminine– while our society overvalues what it perceives as masculine. The aesthetic self, it says, is useless, chthonic, subjective, and self-indulgent. This is wrong. Beauty and joy are reasons to live; increasing a factory’s efficiency by 2 percent is not one.

 

One who becomes fully adult will be tasteful and altruistic, I’d argue. It is meaningless to “be happy” if not virtuous; it is pointless to have beautiful experiences but not share them. One ought to wish to make the world better not only for oneself, but for everyone, and for generations to come. This requires insight, knowledge, and care. One must become a truth seeker.

6. The Truth-Seeking Self (Elderhood; The Judge)

Archetypically, truth-seeking is the job of an elder, but by this point, these selves have diverged from chronological age. There are 25-year-olds who are deep truth seekers, and lecherous, socio-sexual old men.

Perhaps it’s the experience of facing death that activates the truth-seeking self, but we all face death. Not one of us shall escape it.

Erik Erickson described the midlife conundrum as one between generativity and stagnation, and I think he’s mostly right.

This is one form of the midlife crisis, which seems to occur when a person’s lowest unsatisfied self charges to the fore.

The pathetic, self-indulgent midlife crises we love to mock (cf. American Beauty) are at the socio-sexual level. But, it’s possible to have a midlife crisis on an aesthetic or truth-seeking level. I’m pretty sure my midlife crisis started around my mother’s death (when I was 29) and it has led me to nobler goals: I want to write beautiful prose, and (though I write fantasy, whose reputation is of being purely aesthetic, not literary) I want to delve into deep issues of the human condition, as well as I can.

Lest it seem that I can ranking truth over beauty, contra Keats, that’s not my objective. They are interconnected. Truth can be a source of beauty, or a mechanism that allows us to find it.

All of our selves have value. Our sensory self tells us where we are in the world. Our positional self exists to keep us out of danger. Our cognitive self gives us language; our socio-sexual self gives us motivation until the aesthetic self is mature enough to take over. Truth that does not, in some way, provide beautiful experiences or prevent ugly ones, at least to someone, is mere cognitive formalism. The objective of a truth-seeker isn’t to discover things that are true, because there are myriad meaningless truths, but to to reach the best– deepest, most resonant, most useful– truths.

We realize that we’re going to die. (That is the Truth before which other truths bow.) We realize that none of us know what comes afterward, not even the people (on both sides) who think they do. But we can give our life maximal value and purpose, and that seems to be the best preparation for death.

This truth-seeking self can take us to ethical heights. It can lead us to build better societies. However, in corrupt people, its tools can become calamitous. True truth is charismatic, but equally so are many false truths. That’s what fascism and religious cults (charismatic, well-structured false truths) teach us. Hitler and other high-ranking Nazis were drug-abusing mystics, and it’s likely that they activated these higher selves– the truth-seeking self, and possibly the higher, mystical ones– though they did great evil.

Each self has a different notion of conflict and what is “bad”: painful for the sensory self; threatening for the positional self; stupid for the cognitive self; disgusting for the socio-sexual self; ugly for the aesthetic self. The truth-seeking self confronts all manners of bad: the unethical, which is distinct from the immoral, which is distinct from evil. It even recognizes the favored conflicts of literary fiction: good versus good (Little Fires Everywhere) and bad versus bad (Gone Girl).

This said, while the truth-seeking self might learn of good and evil, nothing always compels it to choose good. We bet, in kind with Martin Luther King’s theory of history, that a certain Law of Large Numbers applies, as most of us choose good. Even though a small percentage of people ever activate the truth-seeking self– we still call it “visionary”, though it would be mundane if we were more evolved– it seems that enough do so, and enough of those break the right way, that human civilization advances, if slowly.

The truth-seeking self is rational, wise, and kind. It knows many things. It knows why ugly things are sometimes beautiful and why beauty becomes stale. It understands socio-sexual manipulations, and it gives a purpose to cognition. It seems as far as we can go– the highest adult self– and communicate with others. Beyond its threshold, we seem to go alone.

Yet, there’s much it can’t hack. The truth-seeking self must admit not to know what it does not know. What happens after we die, we ask it. It cannot answer.

The next three selves are the hardest to explore, or even define. They’re dangerous, but important; and that they are dangerous does not mean we should shun them. After all, our lives end with a transition that we regard as supremely hazardous. If we can safely integrate these selves, it might be worth a try.

7. The Self-Revealing Self (The Shaman; the Hero)

The strangest and most powerful experiences confound our aesthetic principles, and our notions of truth. Lucid dreaming suggests that we could, in principle, have any experience we want. Could we create a dream world in which 1 + 1 = 3? How long could we live there? In fact, “drug dreams” by former so-called “psychonauts” suggest that the humble, safe dream state is more powerful (and almost certainly less dangerous) than many psychoactive chemicals.

The subconscious and the underworld live here. The masculine parts of the woman, the feminine parts of the man, and alternative answers to questions one thought were resolved long ago, live in this deep ocean. We and it communicate, but sparsely. When we throw a problem into its basement, go to bed, and solve it the next morning, the work was done in a place that exists in all of us, but that few activate as a self.

The self-revealing self is a reality smasher, just like the socio-sexual one. Our mid-childhood rationality fell to pieces when we discovered orgasm; but, we find ways to integrate that. Late-adulthood rationality struggles at the world’s edges, but those come. We think strange thoughts as we go to sleep. We know we’ll die.

What, in the end, is good? What’s bad? Can’t a well-intended action cause misery? (Obvious answer: yes.) Why can a drug like LSD give some people an immensely positive experience and lead others into hell? How can we make ourselves into artists (aesthetic) or judges (truth-seeking) if we don’t know the first damn thing about the world we live in, or who we are?

The self-revealing self’s name suggests recursion. That’s probably intentional. It’s a weird space to explore. Let’s talk about one (and not the most common) usage of the term psychedelic.

The term psychedelic means “mind-revealing”, but psychedelic drugs are one of the less important (and more dangerous) ways to bring this aspect to the fore. The drugs have shown utility in controlled usage; however, uncontrolled hedonistic use, especially by experience-chasing young people, seems to do far more harm than good. It’s probably better, for most of us, to take the slow route: to meditate, and get there when we get there, rather than strapping chemical rockets to our asses.

In fact, most people associate psychedelia with visual hallucinations, overwhelming emotions, or intense introspection. Only the last of these seems like it might belong to the self-revealing circuit. The “trippy” psychedelia is merely hedonic/aesthetic, and there are safer ways to activate that self. If visuals are your thing, go to an art museum. If you want to explore consciousness safely, consider brainwave entrainment (e.g., binaural beats, isochronic tones). We still don’t understand these drugs well enough for anyone to say they aren’t dangerous. The drugs seem to be reasonably safe under controlled settings, and can produce higher-self experiences if used meditatively, but casual use seems to bring risk without profundity, and anyone who uses LSD as a party drug is begging the gods for disaster.

Having discussed what it’s not, what is the self-revealing self? Oh, this is hard to say. Let me first haul out a metaphor: language and writing.

The sensory self knows only sounds: a tiger’s roar. It does not stop for words, and words do not kindly stop for it.

The positional self understands commands and very simple sentences (usually with a first- or second-person subject.) Stop! Milk me! (This is a toddler requesting milk, not to be milked.) Go! I’m cold!

The cognitive self has the full faculty of any modern language, but little nuance. That’s enough for a proof or technical writing.

The socio-sexual self will indulge, and can write perfectly salable porn erotica, and one who desperately needs to sell writing could stop there.

Commercial novelists engage with the aesthetic self: they provide an emotional response, whether it’s a form of intimacy (romance novels, which, contrary to their reputation, are more about the emotional bond of the characters than the lurid aspects) or excitement (thrillers, which keep the reader in life-or-death suspense) or fear (horror, leveraging aesthetic paradoxes) or intellectual achievement (mystery, leveraging the “Aha!” sensation) or wonder (fantasy, bringing us back to a child’s sense of a bigger world). Provoking an emotional, aesthetic response in the reader is the writer’s goal: a few do it well.

 

There’s nothing wrong with commercial writing, though I prefer to write literary fantasy. To be honest about it, the best storytellers are often commercial writers; because they spend less time per book, they get more experience writing stories.

Literary novelists– the next tier up in difficulty and prestige, though I don’t intend to knock what commercial writers do– seek more than an emotional response. Aesthetics are important to them, but psychological and social truths are even more important. The goal might be to capture, in full accuracy, what it was like to live in Seattle in 1995, or to have been a 40-year-old Buddhist priest who joined a hedge fund in 2006. Or, perhaps the goal is to explore human nature under adversity, with a fable set among animals in the California woods. The story must be engaging, and the prose must be very good, but an additional objective to the aesthetic one is theme: to give what could be a dry, 20,000-word essay, instead, the human power of a 100,000-word story. These novels reach a truth-seeking height.

(For an aside, I am not saying that thrillers, science fiction, or fantasy novels can’t be literary. Metrorealism, or literary-the-genre, is a good genre but not there’s plenty of great stuff outside of it.)

Something very few writers excel at, and it requires a light touch, but an incredible amount of work, is to go to the next level: to master self-revealing detail (and remember that the self being revealed is a character, not author). Aesthetic, commercial writers focus on the story and characters– the art of life. Truth-seeking, literary writers focus on these elements, but also the sentences and diction– the art of life and the art of writing. Beyond that, though, there is something that is hard to put a name on, that comes out of the most precise writing. You see it in a million micro-decisions. Just now, I wrote “hard to put a name on”, not “on which it’s hard to put a name”. I wanted German bluntness, not Latinate refinement. One must know the rules, but know exactly when it is in character to break them.

For example, literary agents (most of whom are failed editors that real editors use as gatekeepers) despise exclamation points. Hate, hate, hate! You will not get one if you use two or more. Of course, that mark is overused by mediocre writers, but there are times when it is in order. It differentiates hot anger from cold anger. (Villains who don’t use exclamation points are scarier.) If you’re writing in character as a six-year-old, you should use it (and you should lay off the complex sentences). If you’re writing a 30-year-old, of course, the weather is probably not “sunny!”

Now, anything that would be called “psychedelic writing”… I would do everything I could not to read, much less write. But, what the best writing does, that no other medium matches, is the ability not just to “get inside a character”, like some kind of alien invader, but to walk pace-by-pace with her. Commercial writing (aesthetic) lets us vet stories that Hollywood may one day pick up. Middle literary writing (truth-seeking) lets an essay be told in an engaging way, but a documentary can do that. There’s a self-revealing level that’s a tad bit higher. No film can capture that wretch, Humbert Humbert, the way Nabokov’s words do. The magic telepathy of fiction (which is absent in mediocre fiction that can still be entertaining) requires a writer to have the talent, experience, and sheer masochism to fuss over commas and pronouns and even information-theoretic concerns. I allow Farisa to use more complex sentences than less intelligent characters, just as Othello’s and Hamlet’s vocabularies exceeded those of bit characters. I cannot promise that what I’m writing will be “high literary” fiction, but I will try. Farisa would put a comma where another character might not.

There’s a metaphor. I hope it helps. It may not. The self-revealing mind tends to poke out in minute details. Why does green have different connotations from red? Why does the female hero have a mark on her shoulder? Why does order beget chaos, and chaos order? What is this world and what are we trying to do here? What awaits us in the underworld or the hereafter?

One of the problems the self-revealing self presents is that people seem to gain strange beliefs when they activate it. I don’t know why that is. I don’t bristle when people claim to remember past lives or understand the afterlife, because I don’t see those topics as necessarily supernatural. If we exist after we die, and have the same terminology, we’ll regard the afterlife as “natural”. I am skeptical when people claim their near-death experiences have given them the ability to predict the future, and that Japan will sink into the ocean in 1997 (which, thank God, it never did). I don’t believe in psychic powers and so, no, I don’t think the self-revealing (or higher) selves can unlock them.

What the self-revealing self can give us is a certain ability to program ourselves; to examine our motivations and thought processes, and retrain them. One might call this “metaprogramming”, but the term has been used by so many unsavory characters that I’m hesitant to use that term.

So much misguided nonsense has been said about “the psychedelic”– and the irresponsible 1960s drug culture did far more harm than good, as recreational drug use seems to be the easiest but worst way to access this– that I’m hesitant to risk adding to the nonsense pile. I hope I’ve done what I can to make the self-revealing self clearer. Most people experience it, but only in dreams, and the few moments before and after sleep. It’s there, and it’s mostly subconscious; it’s worth listening to, but most of us, probably, don’t need to yell at it.

8. The Supremely Vulnerable Self (Atonement; 0)

Let’s say that one mastered the true psychedelic world, turning life into a 24/7 lucid dream. One could have whole-body orgasms with a single thought, decide to perceive orange and blue, and drop out of all human misery. One could burn to death, and still achieve the deep bliss of meditation.

Would that be the final goal? Or would it get boring? We do not seem to be satisfied with any final goal. Is that a result of our human clinging, or our infinite spirit?

Let’s just talk about our experiences as earthbound creatures who know they are going to die. We are stuck between two terrible notions: annihilation and eternity. We can conceive of the possibility of, but could never construct with the tools we have now, an eternal existence that we would want. Our physical brains would run out of space and we’d lose treasured memories (and, besides, the universe will die out some day). A non-physical afterlife is plausible, but we can’t imagine what its principles are. Does it also obey thermodynamic principles? Eternity is distressing; eternal anything is unsettling. At that scale, we don’t even understand time. Has the universe existed for 13.7 billion years, or did a 10-ish-billion-years-old come into existence when there was first conscious life to observe it? How can we talk about life after death when our notions of before and after are bound to such a pedestrian notion of time?

Yet, we also hate the idea that consciousness might end; not the feared (non-)experience but the lack of completion, and the sheer injustice– some people are born, live in pain for a few hours, then die– that it would imply.

If we experience something again and again, it eventually loses meaning. Its hedonic value seems to go to zero. Of course, if there is no experience after death, the hedonic payoff of that is zero. Can we even conceive of nothing? What does nothing even mean? If we let go of everything and float in the void, do we know that we are still there? If we are not there, then what perceives the void? Is there a void? If there is not a void, then did we ever disappear?

Sensory deprivation and deep meditation can lead this way. Some people have achieved it with drugs, but I don’t recommend that route; dissociative drugs especially are dangerous. A severe panic attack induces this, and I don’t recommend that either. Some call this ego death, although I think there are varieties that are terrifyingly with-ego, e.g. “What is happening to me?” A panic attack feels fatal and final; in fact, the terrifying experience is arguably when one is most alive, obsessed to a hot point with survival. There is a state of chaos in which anything seems possible, in which it is as plausible that one is the chair sits on as one is oneself. I can’t put that feeling into words; it’s deeply weird. This experience can multiply by zero, producing nothing; it can divide by zero, producing anything.

All of this– the proliferation and therefore devaluation of experience, or the absence of true feeling– can lead to despondency. I believe it is related to the “dark night of the soul” that St. John of the Cross wrote about. It can be a state of peace, or one of profound insecurity.

One might ask what I think happens after death. Obviously, I don’t know the answer, any more than anyone else does. My guess: the terrifying answer is freedom. The good news: I don’t think it’s liable to last that long, hence reincarnation. I do not think most of us (and I include myself) here are advanced to a state where we can tolerate such freedom indefinitely; rather, we bind to something new, and are reborn.

Just as sensory deprivation frees us, to the point where we experience psychedelia and possible ego loss (even without drugs) death liberates us from a body and a brain. We may not be able to think without a brain– we know that in this world, we do all our thinking with it– so even there, we’re at a loss to imagine what goes on. We might just drift.

I would guess that there is some beneficial-entropic process– a “heat” death we’d actually want– of consciousness toward a final state that mixes enlightenment with annihilation. The good parts of us continue; the bad parts are burned away by a force one might call “God”. That course, I imagine, is long: millions or billions of lives. As for the space between them, I wonder if a not-yet enlightened person like me can do much there.  The tendency to take form and be born again may be irresistible.

I could describe my attempts to meditate into the eighth self, but I could not express them to anyone without comparable experience (who, for that matter, has no use for such an explanation). I think zen koans, as objects of meditation, help us get a sense of what we’re dealing with. What is the sound of one hand clapping? The answer doesn’t matter; if an answer existed, it would be nonsense. Think on the question, for an hour. Maybe two. The process of answering the koan is what matters; that there is no answer lets the process (helpfully) avoid completion.

This is a trip I’ll take for real in about 40–50 years. Whatever I say about it from this side, using the occasional experience that feels like it might be somehow like that, is still a guess.

The space of this self is very dark. Not bad, not evil, any more than light is one or the other. It’s a whale’s song in midnight depths of the ocean. Farisa, in the spring-day forest, closes her eyes and nothing bites her. Dark.

And then, there seems to be light.

9. The Meta-Mortal Self (Return With the Elixir; 1)

There is a saying that there are no atheists in foxholes. It is offensive, and it is not true. There are brave, heroic people who are atheists and a close encounter with death need not convince someone to believe in gods or an afterlife.

This said, I doubt there are any nihilists in foxholes. The struggle to survive would, in that moment, provide meaning. The sense of relief, if nothing else, would be pleasant enough that the soldier would feel, or learn, something. Nature abhors a vacuum, and nihilism would implode if it were a thing at all.

That’s why nihilism’s so dangerous. If nihilism stayed nihilistic, it wouldn’t be militant, and therefore it wouldn’t be bad. All of us experience transient personal nihilism; the self described above does, in the extreme. Nihilism’s danger comes from the high likelihood of this void being filled with something we don’t want: avarice, lust, vengeance, or mayhem.

I’ve spoken out against cultural and economic nihilism. As I said, personal nihilism isn’t evil; it seems to be an inevitable stage. There is, therefore, no value in defining “nihilist” as a tribe– we should not; that must be clear by now– as if we were not all prone to nihilism, because we are. Some religious people attempt to “other” their own doubts by lashing out at nonbelievers. It should be obvious that I’m against that. It’s cruel. It does not make sense to call a person “a nihilist” as if it were a permanent commitment; it is something all of us struggle with: how do we find purpose in what seems to be an oppressively short life, in a world that seems godless and, in the larger scale, mindless?

This is hard to answer. The existentialist view is that meaning emerges from subjectivity and will. It need not be eternal to have value. I tend to agree with this. Even if existence is eternal, it’s not guaranteed to be meaningful. There could be one miserable person in heaven who sits around and says, “This is bullshit”. Perhaps heaven and hell are the same place– the allegory of the long spoons– and heaven is therefore conditioned upon humanist ethics (as opposed to the might-makes-right, anti-humanist, predestination-heavy theology of, say, the founders of our country’s so-called “Protestant work ethic”).

This is something I fight with in Farisa’s Crossing. There is a fantasy race that, in addition to having long lifespans, has developed the ability to recall past lives in their entirety. They know that there’s an afterlife. But God? Meaning? They’re as confused as we are.

I use the term meta-mortal because it’s antithetical to immortal. I see a reincarnation model as most likely to be true. The one-life Christian model, if we view 0 and 100 as total depravity and 100 as perfect salvation, seems to send 49.99 to hell and 50.01 to heaven; it seems more likely that 50.01 comes back as 50.01– Brownian motion, not Levy jumps– but, of course, I don’t know. Let’s say that reincarnation is true. This does not make us immortal. It makes us more mortal. It means we die all the time! The tragedy of death is not swept away; it is multiplied.

Don’t get me wrong: I’d rather go to heaven than be reincarnated, especially if there are no reunions in the time– is there such a notion of time?– between because we all pop in and out at different times. My cats will probably die before me, and they along with a large number of people, I’ll want to see again.

If reincarnation is true, then I’ve died before. To be honest, I don’t fear death– in this life. But I am sure, in such a case, that I have died, in pain and fear, before. It is also possible, then, that I will experience future deaths that I (with different religious or philosophical beliefs) will fear greatly.

And, even if we only live once– either the Christian model, or we face annihilation– there are still little deaths we face constantly… of thoughts, of ways of life, of relationships, of identities. What emerges from all this tragedy? What keeps us going?

As opposed to meta-mortal, I considered the term trans-mortal. In a different world, that would be better. The problem is that I want to avoid association with “trans-humanism”, a tech-industry religion that capitalist atheist nerds invented to come to terms with the fact that they’ve done their 20s wrong. The Singularity (nerd rapture) is something they believe in because, otherwise, they would recognize it as tragic that they wasted their youth for the profit of the super-rich (whom they are exceedingly unlikely to join). It is tragic. Place no hope in robot gods who’ll buy us out of the fact of mortality; to me it seems ludicrous. One should not use religion, of any kind, to blunt the moral stakes of reality. If there is a God, it is not fair to put it on Her to “let God sort ’em out”; clearly, She intended that we not do that.

In that, it seems obvious to me, if there is a God, why She would create a world that seems to be so godless. Death means there are stakes. Life matters. Living in a world that presents the possibility of death being the end means that we do not take life (ours, but more importantly, those of others) for granted. Why, one might ask, would a God “create” us imperfect and force us to go through all this suffering? The answer, I believe, is that God is not omnipotent– or that, if one means God to be an omnipotent being, there is no God. The concept itself breaks down easily. Could an omnipotent being take away its own omnipotence, forever? If no, then such a being is not omnipotent; if yes, then such a being’s omnipotence can be taken away and therefore the being is not omnipotent. It gets weird– weird enough that I’ve rejected the notion of omnipotence wholly. Not only do we not need it to find meaning in life, but it seems to steamroll any attempts we’ve made on the endeavor.

These questions are hard to answer. Heroes return from death, in their archetypical journeys, with an elixir; but our final journey– not necessarily heroic, insofar as it’s completely involuntary– is the one we don’t come back from.

What emerges from the abyss?

I don’t know.

I’m going to go play with my cats, now.

Big Reputation: the Mark of the Beast, Macho Subordinacy, and the Masculine Fourth Turning

I have a new theory, and a more sympathetic one, about the new American conservative movement, sometimes called “economic populism”, and what “Making America Great Again” was really, for many voters, about.

Lest anyone doubt my liberal bona fides, I’m writing Farisa’s Crossing, a novel with a female protagonist and an anti-corporate, anti-fascist message. I did not vote for Donald Trump. In fact, I was physically ill for three days after he won. Though I’d be a centrist or conservative in some European countries, I’m probably in the leftmost 5 percent by U.S. standards. I support gay marriage, and I consider addressing climate change to be one of the most important issues of our time. I wish my taxes were higher, not lower; I support universal healthcare. I’ve lost job opportunities because of my public anti-fascism. I loathe racism, sexism, and authoritarianism of all forms and my writing history shows it.

This said, I don’t think this “economic populism” is motivated by racism, sexism, or xenophobia. I also do not think it is– as often supposed, even by those who admit many conservatives are not racist– that these economically anxious white men discount the suffering of people different from them. In fact, I think that most of them, though they may not articulate themselves well, are just as angry about corporate capitalism’s ill-treatment of women and vulnerable minorities.

What’s going on? There’s something at hand that few people have noticed, or articulated. I don’t think it’s fair to write off the entire conservative movement as having nothing to say, only there are some racists, sexists, and fascists– the people Hillary Clinton rightly but impoliticly called “deplorables”– among them. What, at root, are they so angry about?

The “PC Culture” Threat

Some people will admit that they voted for Trump because they’re sick of “PC Culture”.

It’s fashionable on the left to hear that in the worst possible way– to infer from a dislike for “PC Culture” a desire to be racist and sexist. That’s really unfair. There are sensible adults on the left, and we also make fun of the PC idiocy– some of us openly, and most of us in private. We don’t have much respect for the college kid who slacks off, gets a B- (a Millennial F) on his final exam, and then excuses his lack of study with a complaint that the course material was “patriarchal”.

For an aside, I used to be an agoraphobic, so I know all about “safe space”. A competent therapist will push you to get out of your safe space; if you indulge the panic monster, it owns you. It is a loaded, disability-related term– if I wanted to get PC on this, which I don’t; because I think in this context it works well– and it describes what you’re not supposed to do. Likewise, if someone does something that triggers a panic attack, it is not his fault. It is my biology and my responsibility to take control of it. Anyway, back to business….

I am leftist because I’m culturally conservative. What’s the biggest threat to our civilization? Militant nihilism. It comes at us from left and right. Leftist nihilism takes the form of postmodern moral relativism or, at another extreme, rigid adherence to a identity-political religion. Right-wing nihilism comes from the corporate system, the entropic purpose of which is to turn everything people value– anything that can be “converted into dollars”, and this includes attention, social access and cultural resources– into the heat-death lowest form of value: wealth owned by the richest people. Inequality is a complicated topic– perfect equality can’t be achieved; full equality of results is not desirable– but anyone who cannot see that, all else being equal, $1 held by a billionaire is a lower state of value than $1 held by a hungry person, is not thinking straight.

One man– at once a public intellectual and YouTube celebrity, a combination I did not expect to see– who stands out as an anti-nihilist is a center-right psychology professor at the University of Toronto, Jordan Peterson. He has been inaccurately portrayed both by ignorant, knee-jerk leftists (seeking to paint him as a fascist, which he is not) and repulsive elements of the right (“alt-right”) that wish to co-opt him. There are a number of videos of him on YouTube, that he did not post, with misleading titles that present him as having extreme right-wing views. His actual positions are nuanced. I urge everyone to listen to one of his class lectures before forming an opinion of him.

I disagree with Peterson on a few things. For one, I think he focuses more on the militant nihilism (“neo-Marxism”) of the left. Perhaps I would feel that way if I were in academia. From where I stand, though– the U.S. private sector– the right-wing nihilism is much more of a threat.

The leftist nihilists are winning a few battles in academia, but losing most of them elsewhere. On the other hand, the center-right corporates– centrist insofar as they are more wedded to their authoritarianism than to rightism or capitalism– control most of daily life. There is no opting out of the purposeless work and cultural degradation that corporate capitalism has wrought. People can choose not to read Foucault and Derrida; they cannot choose not to go to work and, for most people, that means being a corporate subordinate and losing the bulk of one’s life to pointless activity.

“PC Culture” may not be an existential threat to our civilization, but it is a bad thing. It’s a lot less bad than the racism and sexism and ableism that it emerged as a reaction against, but that doesn’t make it good.

See, there really are people on the left who make a performance art out of being offended. Of course, they have a right to be heard– one can rarely tell on an individual basis who’s sincere and who is playing some kind of game, so I’m hesitant to write an individual off as a “performative leftist” as opposed to someone feeling genuine offense– but I’ve dealt with professional offense-takers and they’re insufferable. When the virtue signaling spills over into campaigns to ruin individuals’ careers, it has gone too far, and the professional offense-takers who cry “Wolf!” make life harder with people who have real grievances.

We still need feminism, anti-racism, and anti-feminism. We may need our legitimate social justice impulses more than ever, because things are getting weird and the bad guys of the alt-right (and they are bad, and they are scary) are coming out. However, we don’t need divisive identity politics and we don’t need the PC lynch mobs that rise up to get people fired over one stupid tweet.

Why is there such a hatred for “PC Culture”? Some people are racist, sexist, antisemitic, homophobic and otherwise bigoted, and I have no sympathy for any of those assholes. I do not think they make the majority of those who complain about “PC Culture”. Rather, I think there are also many middle-of-the-road people who fear being fired, pilloried, frivolously sued, blacklisted over a small mistake, a nonexistent or small transgression, or even a deliberate misrepresentation of their speech or actions by someone with more influence or reach.

How common are these things? Well, do I know innocent people who’ve lost jobs to PC lynch mobs; but, I know a larger number of innocent people who’ve left jobs because of harassment. If we’re talking about a man, I’d guess that he’s 100 times more likely to be fired for having a sick kid or parent (this is shockingly common) than over a stray dick joke. I’ve seen so many true sexual harassers– deliberately predatory men who really ought to be fired and sued– evade accountability in the corporate world that I bet it’s rare for an innocent man to be strung up. It’s probably more common for a man to be sexually harassed than for him to be falsely accused of the crime.

So, if PC lynch mobs are actually quite rare (as they seem to be) then why is there such commotion about them? It’s a lot more common– and objectively unjust, and illegal– for an employer to fire someone with a sick child, but the former story travels more than the latter. Why?

Let’s talk about the long, dark donglenacht of the soul that unfolded in 2013, or as it is more commonly known, “DongleGate“. Here’s what went down: a man made a few dirty jokes, including a dick pun off the word “dongle”, at a conference. A woman, even though she’d played the hilariously offensive game Cards Against Humanity the night before, decided to get triggered. (Again with the SJWs and their damn misappropriated panic-disorder lingo.) She shamed the two men, with a photo and a nasty tweet. She didn’t deserve what came next, but she made a mistake. She shouldn’t have done that. The man’s cowardly employer, Playhaven– may they rot in hell for this– fired him.

In a better world than what we have, we’d have seen idealistic young people, incensed by Playhaven’s cowardice, encircle the headquarters and barricade it, allowing rank-and-file employees to leave while safelybossnapping” Playhaven’s executives until they gave the man they fired a public apology and either reinstated his employment or offered a fair severance as an admission of their own wrongdoing and cowardice. That’s what decent outraged people would have done. Unfortunately, there are some terrible people on the Internet (who knew?) who expressed their outrage in a different way….

Some of the worst people in the world descended. They sent rape and death threats to the woman who posted the tweet. They called her employer. All of that was inexcusable. Did she do a bad thing? Yes. But she, as a vulnerable individual, ought to have been left alone. It is one thing to target a company that fires an innocent man; it is not OK to send threats and harassment to a woman who fucked up on social media… I mean, we’ve all been there. In the end, the shitstorm led to her cowardly employer, SendGrid– may they also rot in hell for this– firing her.

At the end of this dongle controversy (dong-troversy?) two regular workers got fired. That’s a damn shame. What happened to the cowardly executives who dumped these people when their reputations were at risk, and when needed an employer’s support the most? Nothing, to my knowledge. That’s also a damn shame. These cowardly, evil, socially worthless executives are the people who need to be punished– not regular people who make regular mistakes.

At some point, we as a society will have to do something about the corporates. We need to unify, not let them divide us. The story of DongleGate is not one of woman versus man; it is one of cowardly scumbags in positions of power who dumped people on the streets because of inane social media drama.

So why is DongleGate interesting? With 7 billion people in the world, weird things happen all the time and most don’t get talked about. What, about this one, struck a nerve?

Let’s analyze a similar case: a mild-mannered software engineer, James Damore, was fired from Google after posting, seemingly in good faith, an essay on the possibility of distributional differences between male and female inclinations toward technology. (It is not controversial in empirical psychology that these exist.) He wasn’t fired for the essay; it was largely ignored. He was fired, due to executive cowardice, in the shitstorm that followed.

Personally, I think Damore was wrong on a few points. I’ve worked in the tech industry for a long time. The industry is hostile and exclusionary toward women– there is a lot of sexual harassment in it, and although it does not seem to deliberately underpay them, it does under-promote them. Also, the slight psychological differences (which may not be innate) one observes do not explain away the gender disparity, either in the industry at large, or in its leadership. It is probably true that even if the industry did everything right, it wouldn’t achieve a 50/50 ratio… but the observed ratio (about 20/80 in staff roles, and 5/95 in leadership) is ridiculous, and clearly indicative of problems in the industry– and they are legion.

I shared Damore’s story with a friend who doesn’t work in the tech industry, and she wasn’t sympathetic. “What was he doing, posting that thing at work?” Having worked at Google, and in many other corporate environments, I know what she meant. It’s never wise to share opinions on gender issues, at work, with ten thousand colleagues. It can only be used against a person. Damore’s move was not wise. But did he deserve to be fired? By the stated rules of the tech industry, no. He offered a controversial (and, in my view, incorrect) argument in good faith.

So let me disclose that I worked for Google in 2011, also as a software engineer. I made a somewhat similar mistake: I criticized a business decision. I was proven right (after I left). The fallout continued after I left Google; my name was placed (and may still be) on one of the suspected unionist lists that is passed around Silicon Valley. I have lost job opportunities (and I have collected settlements) because of that. I suspect that I am as notorious in some circles as James Damore, though (for personal reasons) I haven’t courted public notoriety.

Google claims to value internal dissent. Most tech companies say they do. None actually do. A historical analogue of this is the Hundred Flowers Campaign in Maoist China. Mao professed to be ready for liberalization and debate, in order to get dissenters to expose themselves. Not a year later, he cracked down on them. The corporate courting of internal dissent that one sees in tech companies is similar. Executives are not keen on hearing the peons’ ideas; they just want the troublemakers to expose themselves.

Traditional companies for adults do not make pretenses about radical transparency and openness to dissent. No one at Goldman Sachs thinks he can send a political manifesto, even a benign one, to ten thousand people and hold that job for much longer. Tech companies, however, nurture a halfway house post-college culture, because it makes young people more willing to subsume themselves entirely into work.

In general, tech companies’ executives ignore the gnashing of proletarian teeth on mailing lists like “eng-misc” or chat rooms like “#general”. It never helps to have a mailing list presence, and it can hurt, even if the contributions are benign.

I’ve been in tech companies long enough to know how these giant tech firms that’ve been around for 20 years can say they’ve “never had a layoff”. They fucking lie. The layoff is dressed as a performance-based firing, because (1) they don’t want to pay severance; (2) they don’t want the press of an above-board layoff, fearing their best people will leave; and (3) they want to keep being able to say they’ve never had a layoff. So, instead of a layoff, they have a “low performer initiative” and, instead of being an unpleasant thing that happens in an afternoon and is then over, it becomes a political witch hunt. (If they use “stack ranking”, they do it once or more per year; the fun never ends!) The first people to be pressed? The self-identified troublemakers on mailing lists. It doesn’t matter if they were troublemakers in good faith, or even if they weren’t making much trouble– often these decisions aren’t made based on what is said, but on the word count alone.

So, James Damore would likely have faced termination, not for what he said, but on the supposition that anyone who’d write such a prominent memo was not using his time for his assigned work. In that light, Damore’s career at Google, had it not ended in PC flashover, would have gone out silently in the hundred-flower harvest.

We can understand what happened. It is a dirty thing to admit in public, but I know how tech executives think. Why, though, do stories like Damore’s resonate? Tech companies fire hundreds of people per day for being disabled or having pro-union sentiments or for having sick kids and driving up health premiums; why do those unjust terminations (far more common) stoke so much paranoia? Why are men so paranoid about this one thing?

There is an answer, something deep and true, and that will be terribly hard to resolve.

Take a deep breath.

We have allowed the nihilists– mostly, the corporate nihilists, a case I’ll soon make– to ruin masculinity. This has been a disaster for men and women both.

 

Masculinity vs. The Hydra of Reputation

Here’s where I put myself at risk. Let’s talk about gender.

The extreme leftist position is that all aspects of gender are socially constructed (we’ll get to what that means) while a hard-line traditionalist might believe that 1950s gender roles suit everyone perfectly and the rest of us just need to get in line. Very few people, I would think, buy in to either of these extremes. And I hope no one is at all sympathetic toward the rabid, medieval anti-feminism that exists in parts of the Middle East.

This said, let me state two truths about gender. One is traditionally liberal, and the other is conservative.

Number 1, the liberal truth: people do not all conform to gender norms, and we have no right to expect them to. There have always been men who are attracted to men, women who are attracted to women, men who want to live as or become women, women who want to live as or become men, and people who identified strongly with neither or both genders. There is a long tail of gender inclinations, and there always has been, although oppressive social norms (e.g., the mistaken belief that gay or transgender people were mentally ill) in the past may have hid the fact.

As a society, we must value the civil and political rights of transgender, genderqueer, and otherwise non-binary people as we would our own. They should never be denied jobs, housing, or educational opportunities because of who they are. If a person born with a penis wants to become a woman– in identity, hormonally, or surgically– it is none of my business.

Number 2, the conservative truth: two genders, combined, make up about 90 percent of the population: heterosexual male and heterosexual female. This 90 percent figure is a bit lower (50–70 percent?) if we insist on total heterosexuality; it rises to 98–99 percent if we include cis-gender homosexuals and bisexuals with their respective gender groups (and, I would argue, we should).

I would never say that we should not show kindness and uphold social justice toward the non-conforming minority. But, most people find themselves well-served by gender roles corresponding to their sex at birth. Most men want to live and feel like men, and are attracted to people who act and live like women. Most women want to live and feel like women, and are attracted to people who live and act like men.

As a corollary, 45–49 percent of the population– cisgender men– will align themselves with some variant of traditional masculinity. We should not ignore it; we should not demonize it; we should not infantilize it.

Of course, gender is a spectrum (I’m back on my native liberal side). If we use “25” and “75” to represent the points (on a 0–100 continuum) where society expects men and women to be, the reality is that most of us are closer to the middle. The median man’s probably a 35, and the median woman might be 60. I’m probably 42 or so, more feminine than most men, but slightly “masculine of center”. As someone who’s attracted to women, and married to a woman who’s attracted to men, it has always been convenient for me to stick with my born sex. But I respect the wishes of people for whom that that is not the case, and I don’t identify strongly with masculinity. In fact, I believe reincarnation is literally true; just as I have been other races and religions in previous lives, I have probably been a woman in half of them.

All taken together: we need to respect gender variations, but we can’t lose sight of the fact that mainstream gender applies to most people. Moreover, most people who deviate in one way are typical in others; so, plenty of gay men identify with masculinity, and plenty of lesbians identify with femininity. There’s no dichotomy between the liberal and conservative truths put above: we can extend social decency, kindness, and justice to people in the two main genders that make up 90 percent, as well as to those in the other 10 percent– the long tail of more infrequent gender constellations.

Okay, so we agree that gender fluidity is a thing. What about biological differences between the two main genders? There are some. Gender is not completely socially constructed. Yes, differences within groups are much larger than those between. Yes, it is immoral (and, in many jurisdictions, illegal) to treat people poorly because of their gender. Yes, it is still unclear to science which aspects of gender are intrinsic, which are epigenetic, and which are socially constructed or arbitrary. However, if we ignore the inclinations of 90 percent of the population, we do so at our peril.

So, what are masculinity and femininity? To what degree are they socially constructed?

First, we have to note what a social construct is. It is not a pejorative notion. The week is a social construct; there is no such thing as “Thursday” in nature. Here’s another one: red lights mean stop and green means go. That’s an arbitrary social construct, but it’s useful. Social constructs can also harbor deep truths. For example, marriage is a (useful) social construct, while the superiority of monogamy and pair bonding for family formation is an inflexible human truth.

Masculinity and femininity are partially socially constructed. Partially.

Societies’ feminine ideals vary quite a lot, and they change quickly. For example, some cultures consider thin women to be beautiful, while others prefer women to be Rubenesque. Some cultures give sex workers a sacred status, while others outlaw and stigmatize sex work. Some cultures discourage women from working outside the home and others expect them to do so. What cultures want from women, what they consider beautiful, and what is fashionable, all change by the decade.

Masculinity, on the other hand, has a fixed core: a man protects, and he provides.

This does not mean that women can’t also protect and provide. Women can, and they’re often good at it. This doesn’t mean that a man should be ashamed if his wife makes more money than he does. It only means that the man must keep himself up to the job. Society needs people who protect and provide. As I said, women can do this work and are often good at it; but men must do it, or they are not men.

On that, let’s talk about what it means when we say a low-quality male is not a man. We are not calling him a woman, but a boy. It’s his juvenility, and not femininity, that draws contempt.

I also believe that this core masculine demand on men is inflexible. It’s possible that gender expectations will converge. In that case, it will be a movement of the feminine social contract to a traditionally masculine position. The core requirements of masculinity that have been in place for fifty thousand years are staying put.

What does this have to do with the overhyped fear of “PC Culture”? What does it have to do with the desire to “Make America Great Again”? Quite a lot, it turns out.

Many things were bad about the 1950s and ’60s, but there’s one critical way in which that period was better and more civilized than the current day. In that time, a man earned jobs based on his skills, talents, and efforts. A man could survive on what he could do.

I disliked Trump, I voted against him, and I still loathe him; but, “Make America Great Again” was not, in my view, about pushing women or minorities down. Rather, it was about bringing back the time when a person could get a good job on an hour of conversation. In the 1960s, there were no back-channel references, credit checks were not a condition for employment, and there was no treasure trove of social media that an employer could plumb for embarrassing things that he– or someone else with the same first and last name– said 17 years ago.

In that world, jobs were plentiful and skilled people were in demand, so a man could live on his abilities. In today’s world, he needs a lot more. We see calamities like unpaid internships and shameless corporate nepotism. We see people fired or denied jobs over things they said that were taken out of context; no one would take the time to read what they actually said, because hungry workers are so plentiful (in a job-scarce world) that individual laborers have become worthless. America really is, economically, less great than it was before and we need to come to terms with that.

Though we can and should reduce the carnage, Millennials are fucked in a way that has already done lasting damage. To illustrate my point, I worked at a grocery store in 2000 and remember how older people (b. 1920–30) used to carry coin purses, because in the Great Depression, one had to track every cent. It became a habit for them. Likewise, even if we solve every healthcare problem we have, we’re going to have preventable deaths of 70-year-olds in 2055 dying of preventative causes, because of what we’re doing now. They will, because going to a hospital meant life-wrecking debt in their formative years (today), develop a habit of avoiding doctors that will kill them decades from now.

To get a sense of what things used to be like, on the job front: fifty years ago, a person with no connections could pull up stakes, drive across the country– Friday to Wednesday, 600 miles per day– and arrive in a city where he’d never been and knew no one. On Wednesday afternoon from the hotel, he’d call up the CEO of a company, asking for an hour of conversation and perhaps offering to buy lunch (although the CEO would pay). They’d talk over lunch on Thursday about Shakespeare or birdwatching for an hour or two, and the city’s newcomer would start in his new job, as the VP of something, on Monday morning. That’s how the corporate world used to work!

What changed? It is not the advancement of women and minorities that stopped this. In fact, while the story above is slightly privileged, it wasn’t white men who had those opportunities; it was the well-educated (who tended to be white men, because society sucked in other ways). If you went to college, you could make intelligent conversation, and if you could make intelligent conversation, you could get an age-appropriate executive role anywhere.

These days, you can’t get that kind of job (or, increasingly, any job) without a reputation.

This evolution is bad for everyone. It’s bad for men and women. It’s bad for whites and people of color. It’s bad for New England Yankees who’ve been here since the 1650s and for brilliant autodidacts who came over from Mexico last month. We shouldn’t be divided. It is not a political or racial or gendered issue, this wanting to take our country back from the 0.1 percent, in order to restore it to a job-plentiful state. We all need to do this together.

The enemy isn’t “others”. It certainly isn’t immigrants who just got here. Jobs are scarce for one reason: the 0.1 percent is stealing all the money. Instead of investing corporate profits into R&D and growth, they buy back their own stock and pay themselves bonuses. On top of that, they support corrupt politicians who give them tax breaks, resulting in a slowdown of federal R&D and politically induced dysfunction of the government. It has to stop. We need to get our national act together..

The linchpin of today’s corrupt system is what I call Big Reputation. It’s the system, facilitated by technology, that presents itself as a meritocracy because it wants to ratify the supposed superiority of the upper classes– people whose daddies can buy them positions on “30 Under 30” lists and get their go-nowhere startups “acqui-hired”– while it leaves the rest of us in confusion and darkness.

Big Reputation is bad. It hurts women and it hurts men. It hurts white people and black people. Yet, we’re seeing a stronger anger against it from men. That’s what the hatred of “PC Culture” is about. Why? Here’s why:

It is a truth universally acknowledged that a man who lives on his reputation is a failed man; a boy; no man at all.

“PC Culture” angers men not because there is a high probability (there isn’t) of their reputations being destroyed by it. It’s deeper and more serious than that: it angers us because it reminds us that, in 2018, we live on our reputations in the first place. We’re not supposed to. Useful men live on their skills and abilities; useless men live on their reputations.

Does Big Reputation mean that our corporate overlords have won, and we are now perfectly fungible, and we are now all completely useless? Perhaps. It’s a distressing thought.

As I’ve said, there’s much in how societies construe gender that is flexible, but this core element is not. To be a man rather than a boy, a man must live on his skills and talents and efforts. It has been that way for fifty thousand years. If he lives on his reputation, he is a preening fuck; a failure; a thrall. It doesn’t matter if he makes $2 million per year. If someone can “pick up a phone” and end him, he has failed at being a man.

This doesn’t mean that men can’t benefit from their reputations. If reputation makes the difference between having four clients versus three, that’s fine. But a man who lives on his reputation, and could not get on without it, will fall invariably into self-loathing and self-destruction. It’s how we’re programmed. And, in 2018, thanks to both the technological changes that make Big Reputation possible and the job scarcity that makes it potent, men increasingly live on their reputations. This is great for the booze industry; for society as a whole, less so. It’s not good for men, obviously. It’s not good for women, either, because they are not attracted to weak men.

So, yeah. That’s the real reason why “PC Culture” makes so many men want to blow some shit up. They aren’t racist; they aren’t sexist; and the probability that their reputations are actually damaged by a PC lynch mob is (as discussed) very small. But it reminds them that they live on their reputations. The existence of the threat humiliates them.

It also makes sense that what I am saying would be true. A man who lives on his reputation does not provide for or protect his family; those who say good things about him do. Positive reputation is fragile. Negative reputation can be indestructible, like a hydra, even if each claim against the man is refuted. Employers abuse this power, which lasts long after the workers move on to other jobs, to emasculate them. It is not a fear of being fired that prevents workers from unionizing. They’re afraid of bad references, malicious disparagement, and blacklisting that technology have made easy.

Furthermore, most people lack the ability to opt out of Big Reputation. For a worker not to have “a LinkedIn” and “a Twitter” and “a Facebook” is conceived-of by employers as a political statement. It raises questions like… Do you avoid LinkedIn because you lie on your CV? Do you eschew Twitter because you have no friends and fear you won’t get more than 10 followers? Why aren’t you listed as an Influencer on the social analytics app I just bought? Why can’t you be normal and overshare like the other workers? Why can’t I know what you look like in swimwear?

It also forced all people, great and small, rich and poor, free and slave, to receive a mark on their right hands or on their foreheads, so that they could not buy or sell unless they had the mark, which is the name of the beast or the number of its name.

– Revelation 13:16-17

Okay, but how is Big Reputation gendered? That, I haven’t addressed yet. So, here we go.

For women and men, it’s undesirable to have a bad reputation. I don’t intend to claim that either gender has it easier on that front.

What’s different? For men, whether the reputation is good or bad doesn’t matter: for him live on reputation at all means that he is incompetent, because he’s not capable of living on his skills. That is how it has worked for fifty thousand years: the useful men lived on what they could do, and the useless men lived on what others thought about them.

We understand a certain male paranoia in depth, and we can get past the “white male resentment” narrative, because the issue is so much more universal than that.

So who’s responsible for the problem? Not women, not racial minorities; but, instead, the very rich people who stole all the money and made good jobs scarce. They’ve been the enemy the whole time.

Let’s examine something: how are they able to get away with it?

Psychopathy and Macho Subordinacy

American corporate culture is deeply weird.

We call a corporation a fictional person but it’s not that at all. It cannot be killed. It cannot be jailed. The worst that happens to it, usually, is a fine. It’s not a person; it’s a god, and a malevolent false one. Now, when we create gods in our own image, we are quick to give them genders. What is the corporate god’s gender?

Corporate culture is at once hypermasculine and dismally effete. It is driven by a will to dominate for domination’s own sake. Its phallic presence is everywhere, in terms like “up and to the right”, “shoot me a memo”, and “drill down”. This makes the case for toxic masculinity. At the same time, it’s evasive and self-emasculating, relying heavily on the passive voice and useless abstraction: “paradigm shift”, “synergize”, and “deliverables”. Corporate America is at once domineering and preening, machistic and meek. Its gender combines the worst of both traditional genders.

This is what I call an adverse synthesis. It is common for people offering bad deals to combine the drawbacks of two existing models (conferring, from a zero-sum perspective, the advantages of both to themselves) and see if they can make it pass. So, for example, corporate capitalism is an adverse synthesis of capitalism and socialism. The elite– the 0.1 percent– get socialism’s safety net and capitalism’s opportunities for immense wealth. The rest of us get the worst of both systems: the uninspiring, bureaucratic jobs we’d have under the Kremlin, but the job instability of a market economy.

The core of corporate culture is macho subordinacy. It is an adverse synthesis as well; androgynous in all the worst ways. Its purpose, and you see this in the way it uses words, is to give toxically-masculine objectivity to toxically-feminine cattiness. It uses “deliver” intransitively, which is vomit-inducing among people who care about language; “Tom isn’t delivering” lends false objectivity to the middle school girl’s “we’ve all, like, decided–?– that, like, Tom is like, stupid–?– and we don’t like him, okay?” This is just the surface; its crimes against language are legion. It has come to my attention that it utilizes what the popular parlance calls “weasel words” to dampen the immediate impact of unfavorable information. In human words, it insults the listener’s intelligence in order to slow down bad news.

The macho subordinate employee works 90 hours per week on a project that someone else will own. He’ll discard his own weekend, just to make his colleagues look bad. He gets his swell on by calling another worker “not a team player”. (It is odd that managers claim to want “team players”, when real team players would unionize.) He dedicates his life to parasitism, narcissism, and backbiting. He loves office politics, which exhausts well-adjusted human beings but is his natural element.

Where does macho subordinacy come from? Here’s my theory: in the pre-monogamous societies that comprised at least some of our evolutionary history, it had a niche.

Let’s make no bones about it: pre-monogamous societies were ugly. They were bad for women, whose status was that of chattel. In a world where a high-status man could have tens of “wives” and hundreds of children, an individual woman got little attention, affection, or care. Such societies were also bad for most men. Low-status men had no wives and were involuntarily celibate, making them prone to violence. Men of middling status, with one or a few wives, lived in a chaotic society, because the men above and below them in status were always trying to kill each other.

Pre-monogamous societies help us understand one of the ugliest artifacts of the human mind: psychopathy. To be violent, deceptive, and unencumbered by conscience might get a person killed. Or, it might propel him to the top of the status hierarchy. In a sound, stable world where monogamy and relative economic equality are the norm, it’s simply not worth it to take this risk. In a pre-monogamous society, from a “selfish gene” perspective, though, the strategy makes sense. The psychopath is more likely to die young, but he’s also more likely to end up at the top of the status hierarchy, where he can have 300 children.

We tend to think of psychopaths as “evil”. It’s a term that is as close as objective, empirical psychology will allow itself to get to calling someone “a bad person”. Is it, though? It’s hard to say. Personally, I believe good and evil do exist, but I won’t argue that case here, and I don’t think it’s necessarily true that psychopathy is evil. (Certainly, not all evil comes from psychopaths.) A more neutral perspective on it is that the psychopath is an r-strategist.

The notion of an “r-strategist”– or its opposite, the “K-strategist”– is one that pops up in evolutionary game theory, and they correspond to the age-old tradeoff between quantity and quality. The r-strategist plays for quantity and speed (rate of reproduction, r) while the K-strategist optimizes for quality and longevity (carrying capacity, K). An insect might leave a brood of hundreds of infants, and most will die within minutes; animals like parrots and whales have few offspring and high paternal investment. Mayflies breed quickly and live for a day; humans have a handful of offspring and can live 100 years. There are two things to say about this, before getting into the thick of the matter. One: complex species aren’t purely one or the other; we aren’t a K-selected or r-selected species, but both. I would argue that most humans actually have two sex drives: an “r-drive” that has one baser set of desires, and a “K-drive” that would like to have a small number of successful offspring– that is, start a family. Two: in the animal kingdom, and in objective terms, one can’t really moralize. The grains we eat are seeds from r-selected plants that, though they are marginal if found at all in a 500-year-old forest, do very well after a catastrophe like a fire or volcanic ashfall (or tilling by humans). It is because we built society in a certain way, and because we value stability and despise pointless violence or suffering, that we’ve decided the K-drive to be better.

I would guess that human morality evolved in an arms race between our two contradictory sex drives. The r-drive is stereotypically stronger in men, peaks around 17, and has a lot of antisocial desires that are better served by pornography than real life. The K-drive seems to peak around 35, is stereotypically stronger in women, and favors pair bonding and deep emotional commitment. The r-drive wants to fuck as many different people as it can; the K-drive wants to have few children (by ancient standards, that’s eight instead of two hundred) and invest in each one. The r-strategists, if there are too many of them, destabilize civilization, insofar as pre-monogamous societies lead men into positional violence, the stakes of status being so high, and turn women into chattel. The K-strategists tend to be future-oriented progressives (in an apolitical sense of the word) who seek positive-sum opportunities; the r-drive is zero-sum and animalistic. It is the K-drive that civilized us, that told us to slow the fuck down when it came to making babies, focusing instead on maternal and child health. The r-drive cares as much about consent– a notion we invented– as an insect that devours its mate after copulation; the K-drive recognizes not to be violated as a fundamental human right.

Is the r-drive “evil”, or the K-drive “good”? I’m a K-heavy, somewhat androgynous, happily married man. I have no use for male dominance hierarchies or pre-monogamous behavior patterns. So, I’d be inclined to say: fuck the r-drive; it does us no good. But, I don’t think it’s that simple. In the wake of catastrophic depopulation, it’s the r-strategists who get the species up and running again. This is probably why people under constant stress (e.g., the poor, the very rich) seem to be more r-driven while people in peace tend to be influenced more strongly by the K-drive. At any rate, it is our K-drive that both thrives in and seeks stability, and so it is what started civilization, and therefore it makes sense that we would call it good.

We have mythologized this transition– from the constant warfare of pre-monogamous societies, to progressive civilizations founded on pair-bonding relationships– as the angel and devil perched on the shoulder. It is perceived as a conflict between good (progress, stability, kindness, compassion) and evil (stasis, violence, selfishness, indulgence). The universality of this conflict (except among psychopaths, and we’ll get to that) is testament to how deeply both drives are buried in us.

Using these notions, we can look through some elements of our culture. To start, there’s the appeal of post-apocalyptic fiction. Gradual decline (like the kind U.S. Millennials face today) is depressing, and it is boring as shit. I can’t imagine the wake of a true apocalypse being better; if there’s to be a zombie apocalypse, my preference would be to leave this world. So what’s the appeal of a world ravaged by zombies? In the wake of catastrophe (as opposed to the slow decline into dystopia we see right now) the r-driven impulses  become useful. In the wake of a zombie apocalypse, there’s a place for the true alpha male that modern society has no use for.

Next, let’s talk about God. The existence, character, or gender of a true God is beyond the scope of this essay. I’m talking about the supernatural figures– Zeus, Amun-Ra, Jehovah– that we in “the West” have created in our own image. I attended the 2017 Women’s March in Chicago, and one of the signs said, “The Future Is Female”. I think this is archetypically true. When we conceive of God, we tend to split (Them?) into two halves: masculine and feminine.

The r-heavy, hyper-masculine alpha male wants to create thousands of copies of himself. The K-heavy, androgynous parent wants sacred union, transcendence, and improvement. The former is a copy machine on steroids; the latter has higher goals.

The often-masculine God of the Past is the ultimate r-strategist: he created millions of inferior copies of himself and left the world to itself, and now it has gone to shit. In many cosmologies, he doesn’t bother to create an afterlife; the earliest iterations of religion either didn’t have one, or they had a non-punitive but unpleasant one (e.g., the Greek Hades, Mesopotamian Irkalla). Religions tended, historically, to conceive of heavens or nirvana– and, that place whose fury is a woman’s scorn: hell– many generations later. For example, the later Greeks differentiated the non-punitive, gloomy Hades into Tartarus (an actual hell) and Elysium. Jewish agnosticism toward the afterlife yielded to the positive affirmations thereof in Christianity, Islam, and liberal Judaism. The Old Man of the Past yields to her. She is the Mother of the Future; the elven Farissa after whom a certain fictional protagonist, Farisa, is named; the feminine God (Gnostic Sophia) to whom the wayward child is born again and seeks ultimate return. In Christianity, we see this when the New Testament’s God manifests himself as a celibate, androgynous healer and teacher. Jesus does not wrestle bears or shoot lasers from his eyes; he shows compassion, love, and vulnerability– traditionally feminine traits.

Our minds draw from both categories of creative element. We’ve decided, as a society, that humans are too valuable to allow r-strategic behaviors in reproduction; this is why we mandate fathers to pay child support. There is too much cost in creating a human without K-driven commitment. With ideas, though, we recognize the value in quantity-based exploration as well as quality-based refinement. I would argue that brainstorming (divergent creativity) is memetic r-selection. Refinement and editing (convergent creativity) are memetic K-selection. To be truly creative, one needs both.

Finally, let’s talk about monogamy. It was the ultimate “revenge of the nerds”. Most likely, it came from a coalition between men in the middle of the status hierarchy and women. Both wanted to end the male-on-male violence that was characteristic of pre-monogamous societies, but also kept them in squalor. Monogamy also improved the status of women; they became more like partners than chattel. It is a weird irony of our times that a few misguided leftists associate monogamous pair bonding with “patriarchy”. The first feminists– not the best; for sure, not the best– were the ancient people who invented monogamy in the first place.

I hope that I’ve given the reader a three-dimensional picture of the world in which the psychopath arose. Balanced humans have r- and K-drives, and this is a source of conflict within us. It’s why we turn ideas over in our heads for hours, ponder whether the selfish or easy course of action is the right one, and care to define notions of good and evil that don’t seem to exist among lower animals. This cognitive work makes us better, but it also slows us down. The pure r-strategist is what today’s world calls the psychopath, but in a pre-monogamous era, he was well adapted to his circumstances.

Now, are all psychopaths promiscuous men? No. In fact, I think there are two subtypes of psychopath. One is archetypically male and the other is archetypically female: the brute and the bitch. We’ve focused, to this point, on the brute.

Please note, as we work through this ugly topic, that these subtypes do not always correspond to the biological sex or gender identity of the individual. There are men who are psychopaths of the female subtype, and women in the male subtype. In fact, as we’ll discuss, the most successful people in the corporate world are men in the female subtype of psychopath.

The brute is what most of us picture when we hear the word psychopath: a physical bully, a criminal, or even a serial killer. This brand of psychopath had his heyday in the pre-monogamous world. He might have died before 30, but while he was alive, he terrified his rivals and sired hundreds of kids. Today, though, the brute does poorly. He doesn’t grow up to run the world. He has poor impulse control and is just as likely to become a drug addict. He spends a lot of time in jail. His sexual promiscuity, dishonesty, and narcissism prevent him from having a stable relationship. He can’t hold down a job, because he has no sense of permanence, and struggles with the performative submission most jobs require. He also doesn’t have much ambition; the male-subtype psychopath is usually quite lazy. He’s more likely to be unemployed and living on others’ resources (without having the typical masculine sense of shame about it) than to sit in boring meetings with the self-important wads who run the world.

So what’s the other type of psychopathy?

Note that, in study of the human mind, we find few differences (if they exist at all) between the man and woman. I suspect this is inherent to our primate race to become smart. Our development, in evolutionary terms, was so rapid that nature didn’t have time to separate male and female innovations. Anything smart, anything that worked, it put in both sexes. This is why, I believe, there’s so little sexual dimorphism in the human psyche. So it’s likely that, as soon as there was a male psychopath, there were female psychopaths.

Now, what should a female psychopath, in a pre-monogamous society, do?

It’s not good, for a psychopath in a pre-monogamous society, optimizing for r-strategic genetic proliferation, to be born a woman. Lady MacBeth pleaded that the gods would “unsex me here”; she wanted to be a man, because the male psychopath’s game was so much more direct and easier to play. A female psychopath might be able to rise to the top of a dominance hierarchy and run a tribe or even an empire, but there’s no way for her to have 300 children. If she wants to play the psychopath’s game, it must be played through her male children. She must give birth to a male psychopath who will spread her seed.

We see this in Queen Cersei in Game of Thrones. Male-subtype psychopaths seem to be incapable of love, whereas female-subtype psychopaths are only mostly incapable of love. Cersei’s love for Myrcella (a girl) and Tommen (a non-psychopath boy) is probably an affectation, but hers for Joffrey– her psychopathic son– is real. The male-subtype psychopath will ignore his or her children. The female-subtype psychopath will indulge them until they become intolerable little shits.

It’s probably not much of a reveal that corporate executives, though mostly men, are female-type psychopaths. This might explain why they have such horrible kids. It is not through abandon that this happens; it’s intentional. A shitty kid, who gets bought out of his mistakes and lands well anyway because of the parent’s resources, is a trophy of sorts. The roots of this are deep: the female-type psychopath’s ancestral life purpose is to lay tracks for the male-type psychopath who’ll actually spread her genetic material.

What does the female-type psychopath’s strategy look like, in a pre-monogamous context? Gender roles are more severe (not less so) in pre-monogamous societies. So it might seem that it would be preferable for an ambitious woman to escape chattel status, but for the female psychopath, it’s not reproductively useful. She could play the brute’s game, and she might win it, but even if she did, she wouldn’t have the same reproductive payoff that a man gets. Her odds are much better with the bitch game.

She needs to do three things to win the bitch game. First, she needs to have boys. Half of her children will be boys, so that’s not hard. Second, the odds are best for her children if they have a high-status father: an alpha male. (If the alpha’s intrinsic fitness is weak, paternity fraud becomes an option.) Isn’t that enough? Well, no. In a pre-monogamous society, chieftains have harems of wives and lots of children, and most of those kids won’t inherit his social status, because they’re too numerous. Thus: third, she needs to become his favorite. She must be the true wife instead of a wench; her children will then be heirs and those by the other women will be bastards. She can’t just join the harem; she must also rise to the top of it.

What is the male-type psychopath’s favorite tool? Violence. This doesn’t work well for a female psychopath who wants to become a high-status man’s favorite wife. The husband (like a corporate supervisor) can never see her games; he must think he is the one doing the choosing. It’s a beauty contest and he’s the judge, and she can’t make herself prettier, so she needs to make the competition uglier. If she uses violence, the husband will see her as destructive to her property. So, she must work furtively.

Her first tool is to use emotional violence to induce depression and neuroticism in any woman who threatens her. If this works, the targeted woman appears sickly and unfit, so the husband will not choose her. This lives on, without any gendered element, in the corporate world. The limiting factor in corporate advancement is not ability– most corporate work is relatively easy at an IQ of 115 and mind-numbingly trivial at 130– but psychiatric attrition. One succeeds in the corporate world not through performance, but by being able to resist others’ methods of reducing one’s performance– and, if a bit evil, by using such techniques against more talented colleagues.

Her second tool, if the first doesn’t work, is to flat-out lie about the more attractive women. If she cannot make the other girl depressed, neurotic, or unstable enough for the husband to disfavor or reject her, she’ll have to create such an impression. So, she’ll make up stories about the target until she is ostracized. Not surprisingly, this is also common in the corporate world.

The brute (toxic masculinity) and the bitch (toxic femininity) are the archetypes of psychopathy. The first is the one who uses violence, force, and low-bred charm to get his genetic material into as many women as possible. The second is the saboteur who’ll destroy women who outshine her. In the messy real world, of course, there are female brutes and male bitches.

In fact, it’s the male bitch who wins the corporate game.

This is something Ayn Rand got wrong. She portrayed capitalism as an alpha-male theatre of expression. The would-be pre-monogamous alpha males– the brutes– don’t do well in corporate capitalism. That’s fine, really, because that guy’s so toxic we’re better off to be rid of him. The world doesn’t need self-indulgent narcissists, petty criminals, sadists or absentee fathers. In truth, corporate capitalism is much more like the Soviet bureaucracy that Rand detested than the idyllic yeoman capitalism– Jeffersonian and utopian; pioneering and heroic– that she and most conservatives have in mind. And what sort of person wins in a corrupt bureaucracy: the furtive saboteur, the bitch.

Why is it usually the male bitch who wins? We’ve discussed that men and women aren’t very different, and there are historical reasons (but, probably, also epigenetic ones) that men hold high positions in the corporate world. Business, at the upper end, is a game where performance evaluation is so subjective– with reputations taking tens or hundreds of years to converge, as in the arts– that animalistic dominance behaviors drive the day-to-day operations and status fluctuations. If you’re going to ask a rich venture capitalist for $20 million, it’s far better to be a 6-foot-3 man who could (in a different kind of world, the brute’s world that we never forget can exist) kill him, than it is to be a 5-foot-4 woman. This explains the raw strength, in business, of the man over the woman. How does this tie into bitchiness, though? Well, bitches (of both sexes) have strength in numbers, and they’re tribal, and the first people they target for exclusion are those who are different. In business, this means that male bitches can use their superior numbers (derived from physical advantages, as discussed) to out-bitch the women. Often, that’s what they do.

Consider how private-sector bureaucracies are set up. The Company stands in for the archetypical alpha male– a distant fatherly god; an immortal figure who claims to provide meaning, but whose deathless constancy and lack of compassion, which impose a might-makes-right universe, in fact eradicate it. The subordinate executives, jockeying for his favoritism, lining themselves up to be judged in a beauty contest while secretly demolishing each other, are Capital’s harem.

In the pre-monogamous harem, the husband thinks he is selecting a favorite wife based on beauty or charm, ignorant of the machinations that an ugly, unhealthy woman can use to destroy her competition. In the corporate boardroom, Capital selects and promotes favored people on what it thinks is “performance” when, in truth, intrinsic performance doesn’t matter much. There isn’t nearly as much personal profit in “performing” than in the side game that corporate executives play to make their sister wives uglier: disparaging and disrupting the performances of everyone else. This explains why high-talent people are attacked first in the corporate world. (Source: personal experience.) The 17 hours of work that corporate executives do each month might be what Capital– a god manifest in a priesthood called “the board” think it is paying them for, but it’s not what determines who advances and fails.

The corporate world is masculine by self assertion. It presents itself as paternal, ruthless, and militant (“tough love”) against the elements of humanity it deems feminine or inefficient. Yet it is run by men using the strategy of the female-type of psychopath. Isn’t that weird?

It’s not that weird, because I think the archetype of the bitch is genderless. It’s probably no accident that we use the word “bitch” most bitingly for two seemingly opposite, but in fact deeply similar, modes of gender failure: a mean-spirited, resentful, saboteur woman; or a duplicitous, ineffectual, and subordinate man. The bitch will do everything he or she (here, avoiding a gendered pronoun is important) can to wreck other subordinates and rise to the top of the harem, but the bitch will never rise into his or her own. The bitch, male or female, will always be resentful, subordinate, and furtively destructive. In a pre-monogamous society, she is the harem queen at the mercy of her husband. In the corporate world, he is the executive who lives on his reputation.

Now, let’s discuss further the gendered nature of corporate malevolence. Why does macho subordinacy exist? Why might men react differently to it than women do, and why might it treat them differently?

I do not intend to say that corporate malevolence is worse for one gender for another. I don’t know. It’s differently bad for each. It’s also hard for any of us to escape. I find the corporate system’s right-wing nihilism to be more of a threat to civilization than anything coming out of the left. People can opt out of college casual sex and whatever “postmodern Marxism” means, and many people do. On the other hand, no one but the rich and the tenured professors can opt out of meaningless jobs and status reports.

I would size up corporate system’s different flavors of malevolence toward men and women like so: it does not know what to do with women; it knows exactly what to do with men.

See, its malevolence toward women is improvised and organic. It doesn’t set out to be vicious to them, although it often is. It is, or at least wills to be, a male dominance hierarchy in which women just do not belong. Sure, women are half the population. It does not care. It has been what it is for hundreds of years.

I am not saying that workplaces should be this way. I intend to argue the exact opposite. We should not exclude women from meaningful work– that’s morally inexcusable– and male dominance hierarchies are, I believe, regressive and useless. It’s nonetheless true that, as the corporate system conceives of itself, it is an organism in which women have no place. Be angry, but not at me; I am just the messenger on this, and I am disgusted that it is so.

Excluding women from the workplace might be the only thing on which the bosses and grunts, historically, could agree. Executives did not want women to see them abusing other men. It was better that their wives and doctors not know where their trips to Europe really came from. The grunts could take solace in the fact that, as bad as it was to be a grunt, their beatings did not occur in front of women. At least they had that. It’s better to be beat up behind the gym than in front of the whole school.

If you were a college professor, or a government researcher, or a physician in the 1960s, you’d see no reason to exclude women, because you worked in a liberal meritocracy. If you worked in business, though, you knew exactly why the men wanted to keep women out; this does not excuse their doing so, but only explains their motivations.

In 2018, the corporate workplace is even more of a male dominance hierarchy than it used to be. It’s a might-makes-right anti-meritocracy that has tossed aside the “Theory Y” (read: traditionally feminine) notions of fairness, investment in the individual employee, and pro-social behavior. Thanks to Silicon Valley’s so-called innovations (e.g., aggressive micromanagement such as “Agile Scrum“, open-plan offices, surveillance technologies) the toxic masculinity of Theory X has won.

What should we do? Well, it was never morally acceptable to block women from having careers or earning fair pay. In fact, we ought to improve further on that front. Rather, we ought to fix the workplace. Male dominance hierarchies are innately dysfunctional. We ought to evict them to benign and objective contests like sports and video games. We certainly ought not live in a world where a person’s income is staked on such structures.

In other words, the corporate system’s mistreatment of the woman is accidental. It does not want to harass or demean women; it simply doesn’t care what happens to them.

On the other hand, the game the corporate system plays against men is scripted and deliberate. The system has had hundreds of years to perfect its masculine long con, which it rolls out in a new form every generation; Silicon Valley techno-capitalism, with its false claims of being something other than “corporate”, is just the latest dressing on old tricks. This con game presents the lie that Capital’s harem is a rules-based meritocracy, which men find attractive. It is no such thing. In fact, people of merit– being a vulnerable minority– are often the first ones targeted and excluded.

What this system does to men may not be worse than what it does to women; but, the masculine con can be described and analyzed more precisely, because it has had such a long time to evolve.

Both men and women have a desire to feel useful. The need to work lives deep in us. What’s further true is that a man will consider himself useless if he lives on his reputation, even if that reputation is positive. A man who lives on his reputation has staked his family’s safety on the opinions strangers hold of him, and is as irresponsible as the pathological gambler. A man who senses that he is in such a position wilts and dies, and this is what corporate burnout is often about: not long work hours– because long work hours are theater; very few corporates work an honest 40 hours per week, much less 80.

Jordan Peterson has been asked why his work resonates so strongly with men, and his answer is that men demand a sense of responsibility that our nihilistic society does not give them. They’re beginning to see through the corporate regime’s con game. Men want to be able to live, provide, and protect based on their skills and abilities, in rules-based systems, and hate the corporate world’s harem-queen dynamics in which no one knows what the rules really are, and in which reputation is everything. The left has always hated the corporate system, but now the right is coming out against it. We may be able to take it down, if we take stock of what’s really going on.

Why are corporations set up this way? Internal competition– the harem-queen dynamic– doesn’t make companies more profitable. In fact, we had a healthier private sector from 1945 to 1980, when cultural dynamics favored a Theory Y workplace and internal competition was rare; back then, our economy grew at 4–5 percent per year, and now it grows at 1–2 percent. Society doesn’t benefit from the new harem-queen workplace with its fast firings and high-frequency bitchiness. So who does? Corporate executives do. The truth is that these people don’t care all that much about how profitable their firms are; the only thing they care about is remaining executives. The system, as it is, keeps the bottom divided against itself, the middle likewise and also precarious, and the people in charge exactly where they are, with their paid-to-self bonuses “for performance” (yeah, right) rising each year. So, genuine performance isn’t interesting to them; they care more about maintaining control and dominance.

Men are told, in a corporatist society like ours, that the highest form of masculine expression is to get an impressive job title and make a lot of money. Then, they get into the corporate system and see (usually male) harem queens– preening fucks with no masculine virtues (nor feminine ones)– rising fastest to the top. This dissonance is traumatic to men, because it’s largely only men who were stupid enough to believe in corporate meritocracy in the first place. Women tend to know better from the outset. This might be why women favor the well-regulated professions and avoid ill-regulated ones like academia and corporate industry, which devolve quickly into harem-queen systems.

That there is no other option makes it worse; the man is trapped. The basic masculine social construct forces the man into paid work, but all he is likely able to get is emasculating subordinate work and then, to top it all of, he’s likely to answer to a harem queen with neither the masculine nor feminine virtues. Some men just break; they burn out, they get lazy, they renounce masculinity like the Japanese hikikomori. Others, however, double and triple down on self-deception and doublethink– these are the startup bros– and this enables them to ignore their emasculation and tolerate the corporate world.

There’s one final and quite important note about masculinity: some men are very, very stupid. (Some revelation, huh? It only took a few thousand words to get here.) Just as there are stupid people (mostly men) who’ll swallow laundry pods and attempt bicycle roof jumps, there are stupid people (mostly men) who, rather than bristling at a humiliating, subordinate role in the workplace, will turn the misery of it into a contest– a badge of honor, even, to suffer more than anyone else can. To me, this misdirection of masculine energy is moronic. It’s like flooring the gas with the parking brake on: you don’t go fast, and it stinks. Still, there are men whose capacity for self-deception is greater than mine. They’ll accept the macho subordinacy of, say, the Agile Scrotum bro culture in software. What, you can’t handle the sprint deadlines? What are you, a fag?

Many of us are too honest with ourselves, though.

What I’ve described, a sort of masculine apocalypse, is hard to fix. Men live on their reputations more than ever before. In the 1960s, losing a job meant going and getting another one. A bad boss could end a job, but that was it, and after that he had no power. Talking one’s way on to a better job wasn’t that hard=. That’s how America used to be, and that’s how it ought to still be. That’s what made America great.

We now have the tools to understand Big Reputation, this confluence of unprecedented technological power and employer-side malevolence.

In 1965, there were dysfunctional companies, no doubt, that ran themselves based on harem-queen dynamics. However, one could leave such a place. Shitty job? Find another. A worker’s reputation might be ruined, within the firm, by some petty tyrant; in that case, he’d just go off and join a competitor. If you had a college degree and car, you could talk your way on to a job anywhere in the country. That’s why America was great. It had nothing to do with racism or sexism. The worker’s leverage also meant that companies had an incentive not to let themselves be run as harems; a firm that became dysfunctional like that would have people leave.

In 2018, though, one needs a reputation to get a job. What does that mean? It means that the harem-queen dynamics are no longer confined within dysfunctional firms, or confined within firms at all. The harem-queen game has spilled out and occupies the inter-firm level: resume culture. It’s everywhere. It can’t be escaped. Instead of some firms being harems, Capital itself now has one harem and it’s the entire private-sector workforce.

This will not end well.

Big Reputation sold itself to the public as providing an avenue toward fame and independence. One could tweet the 140 characters that went viral and led to a job offer as the VP of Marketing at the next Google. Of course, power law distributions apply. There’ll be a YouTube celebrity here and there, but for every one of her, we can expect hundreds of people to lose jobs because of things their employers discover, that are not relevant to the job but put a person at permanent disadvantage in a too-competitive (for individuals, that is; it is not competitive enough, for firms) labor market.

Micro-fame is not a good thing for most people. It’s just available enough to be used against a worker, but not nearly propulsive enough to bring a person forever out of workaday subordination. Most of us lose in the age of social media and traceable career history. The era of mystery and excitement– when another person was excited to meet you, because he did not think he everything about you– was better than this one. Today, this cloud of information (not all true, but Big Reputation does best in a post-truth world) is used to surveil, threaten, and debase workers.

This might be harder to change than one realizes. Technology is both desirable and irresistible, although we’ll need to manage it better. Unfortunately, its result is that definable work has been commoditized, outsourced, and put to such low status that advancement from it is impossible. What’s left is intangible work. The real job of a white-collar, private-sector worker is not the stated job but reputation management. That’s all we really do, anymore: implement the personal-advancement campaigns of our superiors. Underlings are promoted if they expand and improve the reputations of their managers; executives are promoted if they make their companies look good. Since we’re a nation of 100+ million reputation managers– and isn’t that a horrible thought? but it is true– is it not surprising that an individual’s reputation (no matter how inaccurate, it doesn’t matter) would be more important than skills? Could we expect anything else?

We understand the injustice. We ought to fix it, for men and for women.

Why did I choose, for this essay, to focus on the masculine side of the equation? There are multiple reasons.

First, I’m a man, so I know that side better.

Second, we know for certain that this is an issue men face. It may also become a women’s issue, just as much. As I said, societies fluctuate in terms of how they define femininity– I’ll continue to note that the feminine regimes are often more oppressive than the masculine ones, which is why the world desperately needs feminism– but there is a core of masculinity that does not change. This core is under threat.

Third, it seems to be men who fall hardest in an age of dishonor and emasculation, like the one we face now under corporate dominance and Big Reputation. Women suffer, but men collapse; and the collapse of men often increases the suffering of women.

Why so? Women are allowed to define themselves multiply; she can be a teacher and a writer and a mother. It is logistically unlikely that a woman can be a good mother and a corporate executive– the former is a 24/7 job of ultimate responsibility; the latter is a 24/7 job that involves no real work but constant politicking– but society accepts that she may be both or one or the other. A man, however, is judged a complete failure if he does not win in a game that is more rigged, more zero-sum, and more emasculating with each passing year. In a prior era, when we actually made things, there was a place for men; but reputation management is about as zero-sum as it gets. There is no point to it.

A woman can look at the corporate system’s collapse with emotional distance and say, “Yeah, it’s unfair, and it sucks”, but she is not so deeply dishonored by unemployment or subordination that she implodes and must reconstruct herself. She does not have fifty thousand years of training into the notion that if she cannot live on her skills, abilities, and effort– hard to do in the era of Big Reputation– then she is, by definition, useless.

The peaceful outcome of widespread masculine collapse is what we see in Japan’s hikikomori. This is bad, but at least it doesn’t get people killed. The other masculine response is… war.

The reader might know why I write, now. The stakes are high. We are in far more danger than we think. We must do everything we can to find a final but nonviolent resolution to the problem. We will not be able to solve this if we refuse to look at what’s really going on.

Big Reputation is the highest expression yet of the corporate world’s might-makes-right nihilism. What is said, under Big Reputation, becomes what is true. It oppresses women, but its effect on men goes further; it hollows them out. They become aimless and nihilistic, and this vacuum can be filled by many things. Not all possibilities are good. It is easiest to sell war to angry, nihilistic young men who see purpose in nothing else.

Forward

What’s happening right now isn’t a men’s issue and it’s definitely not a white male issue. Big Reputation oppresses everyone. What differs is that while its actions oppress women, the fact that it’s there at all– an inescapable, global harem-queen culture– is an existential threat to men. Male bodies will continue to exist, but what lives in them will not be men, if Big Reputation is allowed to prevail.

With cis-gender men being 49 percent of the population, and with women likely to become more masculine as genders equalize, and with most women being attracted to cis-gender men and wanting to uphold the ability of men to be men, we can’t ignore this problem. I find it annoying when I hear complaints about how the emerging anti-corporate right is driven by “white male resentment”, as if this made every single person feeling it a racist or sexist. Much of it is economic resentment that is justified; the fact that white men (along with everyone else) feel it is irrelevant and it is disingenuous (and a bit racist) to present it in such a way. This justified resentment crosses categories. None of us, whether we identify more with the left or right, has a true enemy other than the 0.1 percent who made jobs scarce by stealing all the money.

It is probably not correct Latin, but I’ve created an aphorism that I’m fond of: illegitimi non dividendum; don’t let the bastards divide you.

What do I want? Well, we probably will get back to the kind of job-rich society we used to have, but there are two ways this can happen, and one’s better than the other. The better: we take the country back from its elite, and we fix it. The worse: we end up in some kind of war (possibly a civil war) that, like the one in the 1940s, brings us to full employment. I prefer to to skip over the poverty and killing and just go right to the fixing.

Let’s first talk about some technical fixes. We need to curb the abuse of data. I’m not that worried about advertisers. I’m not worried at all about government agencies that may go overboard with their zealotry, but rarely have malign intent. I’m worried about the business world; I’m worried about employers. We can’t rely on a 1960s-era legal framework to solve 2018’s problems. We don’t live in an era where you can call a large company’s chief executive on Thursday, interview for a job on Friday, and start on Monday. Perhaps we’ll get back to that, but until we do, the laws must evolve with our times.

For one example, it should be the law that by default, employers can only make hiring decisions based on information directly furnished by the applicant. I do support an exception: when there’s a public safety element– for example, in law enforcement, sensitive intelligence roles, or even professional driving– one can allow additional information: web searches, social media history, and background checks. When it’s just money on the line? No way; the rights of the worker must win. I won’t apologize for valuing the human right to reinvent oneself over whether a rich person makes $150,000 or $150,100 today.

Is it realistic to expect no one to ever “Google” someone else, such as a job applicant? No. Everyone Googles everyone; that’s not going to stop. It’s the force of human curiosity. We address this in two ways.

First, if someone Googles or Facebooks a job applicant, or talks about him to a friend in a conversation that could be construed as a reference check, that itself should not be illegal. We only need to put adequate reporting in place. We need clear laws about when it is legal, and when not, to make an adverse hiring decision based on such information; if it is not relevant to the job, the law should side with the employee. If information not furnished by an employee contributes to a decision not to hire him, we need appropriate federal filings as well as notification to the employee about what the decision was, when it was made, and why it was made. If a back-channel reference call led to someone not getting a job, the employee has a right to know who made it and what was said, so he can sue the rat bastard, because society just doesn’t work if people like that get away with shit.

There can be exemptions to these reporting requirements. Public-safety jobs present a legitimate reason for employee scrutiny that doesn’t exist when only commerce is at stake. Businesses with fewer than 10 employees should be exempt from many of these reporting requirements, if only because I’m inclined to err in favor of reducing regulations on small companies that might be less able to afford compliance.

People have a human right to know why they are or are not getting jobs. We have allowed mystery and chicanery for too long and it has bred discrimination, anomie, and a never-ending national jobless spell that persists even in spite of the numerical end of the “Great Recession”. We’ve created an age of paranoia and precariousness.

Secondly, we need to give individuals increased control over how the technology giants present them to the public. They should have the right to remove Google hits that misrepresent them. Will it cost money for the tech giants, to allow people to clean up their search histories? Of course it will; perhaps it’ll cost Google $100 million or even $1 billion. Whatever. Google will live.

We need laws that prevent people from missing out on opportunities because of nonsense factors like “I just don’t like him” or “he’s a fan of the wrong sports team”. This means more bureaucracy, but the smart kind. “Bureaucracy” gets a bad name, but people only notice it when it breaks down. When bureaucracies work, it’s fantastic.

We need aggressive government intervention on personnel matters in companies, at least as pertains to the employees’ future prospects. In the DongleGate example, it would have been right for the government to demand both employers (Playhaven and SendGrid) pay two years’ severance to each employee, and that their chief executives apologize for the decisions and state that the terminated employees did no wrong. If these executives did not make such statements, they’d either resign (which would be their right; free speech means one cannot be compelled to say something, but there is no inalienable right to ‘free speech, plus you keep your overpaid executive job’) or face jail time.

We also need laws regarding internal communication within companies of sufficient size. If an employee’s performance reviews can prevent him from transferring elsewhere in the company, then the employee’s right to appeal those reviews to an external authority, such as a government agency or court or union, that can speedily change such reviews, is one that must be upheld. Unions actually solved this problem decades ago, but if we’re not going to go with unions, then we need aggressive governmental intervention until this misbehavior by employers ceases.

Technical fixes, like those above, will solve some problems and scale back the atmosphere of paranoia. They might be able to make capitalism work again. They might not make the country great again (and, spoiler alert, Trump won’t either) but they’ll vet us started. They’ll bring us to Somewhat-OK, and that’s a step up.

What about our deeper problems? Technology has built the monster of Big Reputation, but people would not listen to what it has to say if there weren’t a prevailing job scarcity. We’ve let the 0.1 percent steal too much money and, since Citizens United, we’ve let them wreck our politics. The problem is not Putin meddling with elections; the Koch Brothers did way more damage to our country’s politics than a few Russian trolls and fake news outlets. And what is really causing American decline? Slow economic growth, and we are stagnant because we’ve cut federal funding for R&D, in order to finance top-bracket tax cuts (read: welfare checks for rich people) and because corporations no longer invest their profits into the future and create jobs, but instead buy back their own stock and give it to executives.

How do we fix all of this?

We need to look at the anti-corporate right’s grievances. There’s a lot of overlap between what they have to say and what the anti-corporate left has to say. We have the same enemy: a culture of militant nihilism that has sapped our capabilities, commercialized our culture, created massive economic and geographic inequalities, and pit us all against each other.

I think that some of my colleagues on the left get so wrapped up in winning instead of solving that they start to believe their own polemic, which is that the Republican Party consists entirely of “businessmen, religious nuts, and racists”. If you believe this, then you believe that all the poor on the right are racist or zealots (since they aren’t the business elite, clearly). I don’t think that’s true. I think that their anti-corporate sentiment is legitimate. One of the main reasons why Trump won is that most people in the “Red States” believe that the elitist, corporate fucks running our country into the ground are liberals. It’s not true, but Fox News (an evil corporation) has told them so and the idea has stuck. (In truth, the corporate system is neither liberal or conservative, but largely centrist; it cares more about its own authoritarianism– and hobbling the government’s ability to serve the public– than it does about which party is nominally in charge.) If we could communicate the nature of our shared enemy, and work together on a strategy to fix the country, we might be able to unify and pull it off.

Did Trump shamelessly court the worst elements of our society? Yes. It’s something the Republicans have been doing for years. But, Trump also drew in a lot of middle-of-the-road conservatives who aren’t racist or sexist, but who are angry about something emasculating that almost no one today (including them) understands: the new life under Big Reputation, the age of technological surveillance, the apotheosis of the corporate system.

We can work with conservatives. The corporate system is so rotten that it’s no longer conservative; it is regressive; it is ripping up the earth. Progress and conservation are not, at the present time or ever, opposed. We ought to conserve what is good in our culture, and progress from that.

How do we find common ground in a time that seems polarized? One thing that I have noticed in the U.S. is that politics and personal identity tie in together differently on the left than the right.

For example, most of us leftists and liberals call ourselves “Democrats”, but we’re not thrilled about the behavior of our own party. Very few of us have true partisan loyalty. When “our people” turn out to be hypocrites or predators (cf. Anthony Weiner, Bill Cosby, Harvey Weinstein) we do not defend them. We let them fall out of view, because life is too competitive to let someone who sexts minors to have a spot in anything.

We’re proud of ditching people who fail to live up to our values, but conservative people tend to see that as a vice. They place a higher priority on loyalty to individuals. I’m not sure that they’re wrong, when it comes to the general principle. Cosby and Weinstein deserve all the punishment they’re getting– they deserve more punishment, in truth– but are we too quick to tear down minor offenders, people who say the wrong thing on camera? We might be. The leftist overreaction to Jordan Peterson is an example of this; the corporate cowardice in the firing of James Damore is another one. I admire the true conservative whose value on personal loyalty and integrity is offended by actions like that.

Their sense of loyalty to people, more than ideas, also explains why Republican voters (who, by their stated positions, are center-right rather than right-wing) tend to vote for extremists, ideologues, and incompetents, especially if they are incumbents. It’s not about the voting records (although I wish it were) for many of them; it’s more, “He’s not amazing, but I like the guy, and can I really vote to fire him?”

As I said, most of us on the left will call ourselves “Democrats”, but have a sense of distance from the insiders of the party. It’s different on the right; Republican is a brand. This is why there are conservatives who identify as Republican (loyal to the brand) and others who call themselves independent (and who usually vote Republican, with reservations about the Party).

So what is their brand? What is ours; do we even have one?

The Democratic Party doesn’t really have a brand, though I admire the Minnesota state party’s insistence on remaining the Democratic–Farmer–Labor (or DFL) Party, because brand identity matters. This may be what we need to build off; we ought to shed our image as the party of “coastal intellectuals”. Conservatives are angry because they sense a lack of cultural influence. They see people not like them getting book deals and TV spots at age 22, while they go to work precarious corporate jobs, and they’re pissed. One of the reasons why Jordan Peterson does not trigger them, though he’s a big-city intellectual, is that he kept his Alberta accent and mannerisms.

Core to the Republican brand is a style of masculinity, a sense of rugged individualism, and an affinity for the working man who lives on his skills and efforts– not the preening fuck (someone that, let’s be honest, we hate on both the left and the right) who lives on his reputation.

It’s important to note that not all traits of that right-leaning masculinity are bad ones. (Nor do all left-leaning men fail to have it. The ancient man on whom much of it is based, Jesus of Nazareth, was a leftist and arguably a feminist in his time.) It’s also not only men who care about it; women do, too. No woman will ever be attracted to a half-man who lives on his reputation. This makes all the sense in the world, too. Though I disagree with his politics, the Republican (by brand) who fishes on the weekend is probably a better father and husband (and a better friend, and someone I’d rather hang out with) than the executive manchild in Silicon Valley, who must beg the venture capitalists nonstop to give him– and his career, and his reputation– another day (and who also votes Republican, but will never admit to it).

I am more sympathetic than many of my left-leaning friends, when it comes to American conservatism. I don’t think it is, at core, about racial bigotry or anti-feminism or pushing women out of the workplace. Rather, I think American conservatism draws its core from an acknowledgement of the 50,000-year-old truth (which is not, on its own, conservative, but universal) that skills and effort ought to have value, and that while a woman should be able to live on merit rather than reputation, a man must be able to do so or he has failed as a man and may as well implode. Conservatives want to fix capitalism but, deeper than that, they fear the terrible, nihilistic world that our corporate masters are driving us toward. What they get wrong is their sense that this assault on meaning comes from the left. In truth, corporate executives have done more to strip meaning out of life than a million Foucaults or Derridas ever could.

I would like to find a way to unite the anti-corporate left with the anti-corporate right that we are now calling “economic populists”. We need to understand them. I did not vote for “their guy” (meaning Trump) and I still despise him, but I have no quarrel with them. They are not all racist white men; they are not all racist; they are not all white; they are not all men.

I would never court, or want in such a coalition, the racists, sexists, xenophobes, or religious bigots. Such ideas have no place in modern society. Let’s be glad if we lose their votes. I think there are enough non-racist men and women left over among the so-called “economic populists” to build a new coalition and take our shared enemies– the corporate fucks, the 0.1 percent, the manipulators who surveil and emasculate us with the tools of Big Reputation– down, peacefully, and for hundreds of years. There’s no good reason not to do so.

There’s a perception, in the wake of 2016’s election, that we’re a “politically polarized” country. No, we’re not. Most of us want the same things: universal affordable healthcare, strong public education, moderate gun control, reliable infrastructure, plentiful good jobs, a moderate and smart immigration policy that refreshes the nation but does not tank our labor market, an environment friendly to small businesses, and to take responsibility for our lives but also control of our destinies. Ignore the political branding around “Democrat” and “Republican”. Ask people what they actually want, and we’re not that polarized. We’re just led by a bunch of assholes who benefit by dividing us.

The middle-of-the-road, culturally conservative but anti-corporate, “economic populist” is fucking angry, because our failed society has him living on his reputation. (Or, she is living on her reputation. Or, she is horrified that her husband lives on his reputation. Or, she cannot find a man she is attracted to because men increasingly live on their reputations. Or, he is horrified because he and his husband live on their reputations.) He probably has not nice words to say about “PC Culture”, and he has a friend whose uncle’s neighbor’s doctor’s boyfriend’s college roommate was fired unjustly for a stray joke at work, and this scares him to death– it sickens him, it sickens me, and it should sicken you– but he’s not racist or sexist and doesn’t dislike immigrants. He has probably accepted gay marriage; perhaps his nephew is gay. He may have voted for Bush, but sees the Iraq war as a mistake. He might even accept a tax increase if he’s confident that the money will be spent wisely– on national parks, on public research, on better healthcare. Leftist coastal intellectuals would know this about this guy if they actually went into “the Red States” once in a while and talked to him.

I focused mainly on the masculine story– the deep sense of failure and shame a man feels, whether rich or poor, if he forced to live on reputation, because skill and talent have been devalued– not because it is more important than the feminine story, but because it is something the left, fixated on the (false, I believe) notion that gender is entirely socially constructed, ignores. We’ve let it become a blind spot. It should not be. It drives much of what’s going on today. Caring about what our society does for men does not mean we cease to care what it does for women.

It’s time to unify– men and women; traditional left and traditional right; white and brown and black; religious and not; Californian and Texan and Pennsylvanian and Michigander– and take our country back from the corporates. It is not a partisan issue. It is not even an economic or cultural issue. It is, to put it plainly, a job that it is time for us to do.

Technological Unemployment: Yes, It’s Our Problem Too

Software engineers and people who work for technology companies tend to think of technological unemployment as an issue that affects “other people”, but not us. We, the symbolic manipulators with expensive educations and IQs over 120 (in some cases, well over 120), will be fine, we tell ourselves. Sure, self-driving trucks will kill the last middle-class job that doesn’t require a college education, but why is that a problem for programmers in the Bay Area? We’re so smart, we’ll invent our own jobs (venture capital will give us the money)… right?

We have a sense of holding high ground in a flood. This perception is inaccurate. We are as vulnerable as anyone else. There are multiple reasons for this. I’ll cover three: labor market inelasticity, the triumph of mediocrity, and the most malevolent agent, workplace surveillance.

1. Labor Market Inelasticity

When people are desperate to have something, and it runs short, its price can spike disproportionate to the decrease in quantity. For example, the 1970s oil shocks only saw about 5 percent less of the stuff on the market, but prices quadrupled, and gas lines blocks long became the norm. Drugs (medicial and illicit) and water have the same trait: if they become slightly less available, prices go up. So does housing, and that’s why even though only a small percentage of New Yorkers have rent control, it drives rents up substantially for everyone else. If inelasticity weren’t an issue, cartels wouldn’t work.

People less familiar with economics call this “price gouging” but, in truth, often it’s a market doing what it’s designed to do: setting a price in the most efficient (not always the most desirable) way it can. Prices don’t go up amid scarcity because people are greedy or evil; they go up because something has to ration what’s limited, and in some cases, rationing by price is the least onerous resolution.

Of course, there are cases of malevolence, e.g. market manipulation. There are people who take advantage of inelasticities and cause suffering. There are also cases where markets fail or break down. Conspiracies exist; I only mean to imply that it doesn’t take a conspiracy to activate an undesirable sensitivity (or, worse yet, a feedback loop) in a market.

Though workers are the supply, rather than demand, side; a dual phenomenon occurs and job markets exhibit inelasticity. One might expect a 5% increase in available labor to cut wages by 5%, but it’s often more than that. It wouldn’t surprise me if it cut wages in half.

So, let’s say that 5 million truckers get laid off, replaced by self-driving vehicles. What percentage of them can and will train up and start writing code? Let’s be charitable to the programmers and say only 5 percent make it. That’s 250,000 more American programmers on the market. That’s less than a 1% increase; so we’re safe, right? Well, no. As I said, 1% increase in supply could drive a 20% drop in wages. Moreover, at the same time as the truckers are laid off, the whole supply chain surrounding trucking– hotels and restaurants across Middle America– collapses, too. So there are more people coming in. Some may not be qualified to program computers. Okay, so they become hairdressers. Then, wages dip for hairdressers, some of whom can learn how to write code. A broad-based labor market crash will bring refugees in from all industries (and make many of us refugees into other industries, where we may tank wages).

It takes surprisingly little to tank a labor market. We’re not on high ground; there is no high ground. Even the rich will have increasing cause to fear social unrest.

In many under-developed countries, no one gets rich by working. There are too many workers and too few jobs. College professors make $10,000 per year; teachers make $7,000; programmers are lucky to make $15,000. In such a society, corruption is common because most people see no way to get rich other than to cheat. Of course, this not only damages the culture but keeps these societies poor. Wage collapse is not an out-of-context dystopian threat; it’s the norm in the world, and we’re at risk of that becoming the case now.

2. Triumph of Mediocrity

Most people think that “corporations” want to turn the highest profit possible and that this is what motivates workplace decision-making. Wrong. Most executives want to advance their careers and reputations, with as little risk as possible, and only care about profits indirectly insofar as they manage up (in theory) to shareholders. What do executives care most about? Remaining executives. One might expect “shareholders” to push back, but the shareholders are mostly rich people who got rich by being executives, and so (a) they’re likely to give a pass on executive self-protection that isn’t egregious, and (b) even when they fire executives, they replace them with other people drawn from the same set, so it’s just shuffle. This class of people– a social elite defined by connections rather than talent– isn’t going anywhere.

Executives, by and large, don’t want top talent. It threatens them; they might be outshined by underlings. The fact that nothing but legacy backs their authority might be exposed. Top talent is unpredictable. It’s witchy. It’s also too rare to be a business on, and hard to replace if lost.

Top talent is not expensive. In fact, it’s cheap; for example, a company will pay less for one excellent software engineer than three mediocre ones. However, corporate executives do not mind the expensiveness of mediocrity, because it’s reliable, and because it is so normal to run a business on mediocrity that it will not get them fired. Most business operations can be run on “commodity” talent and, perhaps, should be so; insofar as making existing processes reliable, as opposed to innovation, is what customers and shareholders tend to want. It is not a crime that most jobs are mediocre, because most people are mediocre by definition; the problem is that while high-talent people are a minority, high-talent jobs are even rarer.

There are a lot of overpaid people in our economy, but the truly talented are often the most underpaid relative to what they’re worth. Making it worse, intelligence beyond an IQ of about 125 becomes a disadvantage in the corporate world: such people get bored easily, it is often neurological and irresistible, and yet corporate bosses tend to mistake it as an attitude issue. They are not sensitive to high-intelligence issues; it is not their problem; it is the problem of a small minority they have no reason to care about.

Does society need the most intelligent people? In the long run, yes. Chain gangs of “Agile Scrum” mediocrities do not invent. If we want human society to advance, or for our particular nations to remain relevant through the 21st century, highly intelligent people and how we treat them are crucial. But no single corporation really needs high talent, and individual executives have well-studied reasons to be afraid of it.

3: Technological Surveillance

There will be jobs in the future. Technological unemployment might replace stable, high-paying jobs with tenuous, cut-rate jobs. But, jobs there will always be; it seems to be human nature for those with power to run around telling the rest what to do. This is why it’s absurd when rich people, in American political discourse, call themselves “job creators”, as if it were some kind of virtue, as if the pharaoh in Exodus ought to be a hero rather than villain.

Technology’s long-term negative impact on the workplace seems not to be only that it eliminates jobs (although, especially in the context of inelasticity, that is a concern) because society will form new ones, no matter how menial; but that it has become a surveillance system. Job applicants without social media presence are viewed with suspicion, making privacy a deviance rather than a right. Blue-collar workers face inhumane supervision and have for decades, but white-collar jobs are heading this way, too. Technology makes it easy for employers to watch what their workers do, and to damage the reputations of those who inconvenience or threaten them. There is no fresh start anymore; the Internet itself is forever, but so are the thousands of compensation and “union risk” lists that corporations illegally share, usually verbally without a trace, with each other.

The past decade– in the more disenfranchised social classes, even longer– has tipped the balance of power so far in employers’ favor that we have a sick society. In a time of imprivacy, where people live on reputation rather than competence– a mass emasculation whose social fallout has barely started– people are so obsessed with fame that we see a new mass shooting every week– they are rare, in that most people won’t be affected by one; but they should not occur at all– and young children are eating laundry pods to win internet micro-approvals like video views.

It is unlikely that people intelligent enough to program computers will face a future of no jobs. It is more plausible, in my view, that we will face one of humiliating, highly monitored jobs where our bosses get daily reports on our keystrokes-per-hour and web activity.

I’ve read in a few different places that workplace surveillance is one of the strongest predictors of whether a workplace violence incident (“going postal”) will occur. Productivity surveillance doesn’t just make work unpleasant and humiliating; it also threatens the safety of the innocent.

Be Afraid

The typical “problem essay” is a like a hero’s journey where the essayist describes a gnarly social plight (inciting incident), explores a lot of deep and sometimes unpleasant human topics (the underworld), piling on troubling evidence up to a didactic climax (atonement) and then derives a solution (return with the elixir). I am no hero; not this time. I have no such elixir. I see a situation that is likely to get worse.

It’s nearly impossible for an individual to “push back” against the creeping inhumanity– open-plan offices, unnecessary layoffs presented as “low performer initiatives” that devolve into witch hints, aggressive surveillance of the worker, long hours that achieve nothing, and a culture that values putting workers in their place (so they don’t threaten executives) as opposed to increasing their value to the world– and not be steamrolled. I’ve tried; I know. I’ve stood up for what was right, and been flattened for it, and I still don’t know if there was ever a point to such efforts.

Software engineers are, individually speaking, the smartest people in the corporate mess. Collectively, we’re the stupidest. We’ve also let ourselves become test cases for corporate inhumanity. Silicon Valley– after it ceased to be a genuinely productive place, around 2002– became a sandbox for new ways to mistreat employees: open-plan offices, daily status meetings, back-channel reference calls, disposable companies, unreasonable deadlines driven using psychological warfare, and so on. This should be a source of great moral shame to us. It is for me.

We are not safe. The monsters we are building will not treat us well, and we should be worried.

The Talent Crash

Most of us assume when we talk about technology that, while jobs will be automated out of existence and technological unemployment will be an issue, it’ll most likely be someone else’s problem. At least in technology, we associate ourselves with the unemployers rather than the unemployed. We’re talented, we note. We’ll be OK.

Is that so?

Let me ask a question: what is the universal sign of an untalented person?

Think about it. Write something down.

It’s not being bad at something, because even talented people are bad at many things. No one would pay to watch me play basketball.

Here’s the answer: an untalented person lives on his reputation. That’s it. That’s how it works. Talented people can succeed on their merits; untalented people succeed if they create and exploit feedback loops (wealth and prestige begetting same) in human societies. I suppose that if someone can do this intentionally (and a few people, I believe, can) that would be a talent of its own sort, but most often this is unintentional. With celebrities, it’s called “famous for being famous”. It’s the same thing with business executives, though. I will never be tapped for those jobs; I’m not part of that social network, I wasn’t born into that class, et cetera. But anything those guys could do, I could do better. They’re not talented people. They just have a track record (with support, often invisible, from their social class) that presents an image of professional competence that compels other people to do work on their behalf and keep that impression going. It’s nothing magical.

I don’t think it’s hard to make that case. Looking at the world economy, we can examine the intersection of class and talent. At the bottom, class-wise, the distinctions don’t matter so much because people survive by offering raw labor. There is a reputation component to getting these jobs– a felony conviction is nearly fatal– but it’s relatively easy to stay above that blade. In the middle and upper classes, it gets harder. Talent is hard enough to measure as it is, but talented people are usually doing things other than evaluating talent. This means that our society must trust talentless people to evaluate talent when filling coveted jobs. The results are just as laughable as one would expect, but industrialization is such a win that society can chug along (with 1-2 percent economic growth instead of 5+, but it’s not negative) with mediocre people at the helm. Reputation, and the manipulation thereof, become important in such a world.

Talent doesn’t matter in the workaday world because it’s been successfully managed out of the equation. An adept manager doesn’t bet his company on the intermittent availability of top talent. He tries to find a way to make sure the trains will still run with mediocre people driving them. This is a disturbing realization for me, but my existence on a job site means that, from a cost-cutting MBA’s perspective, someone fucked up. A more capable executive would find a way to replace the expensive, ornery high-talent person with a plug-and-play mediocrity.

Does this mean that society doesn’t need talent? Exactly that, at least in the short term. It should want talent– mediocrities are never going to cure cancer, nor are they going to fix global warming (although, with only mediocrities, we wouldn’t have global warming in the first place)– but that’s a separate discussion. The world benefits from top talent. Do individual hiring managers trying to protect their positions, within workaday corporations that would rather standardize mediocre processes than take a risk on excellence, get what they want from people like me? No. It’s a disturbing realization, but high-talent people need to be aware of it. Google and Facebook are advertising companies, not AI or social-engineering companies. They need a few high-talent people, no doubt, but the fewer of them these companies truly need, the better their executives are doing.

Our society might have want for high talent but it doesn’t really have much economic demand for it. In light of the collapsing demand for top talent, reputation and social manipulation become more important than ever. Which means that the 85th, 95th, and possibly 99th percentiles are forced to live on their reputations, like talentless hacks. People who could once work with their talents are now forced to fall back on their reputations. Why? Because corporate management, on its own terms, works. The system runs well enough on mediocre inputs. To be talented enough to be above the reputation trap got harder. There might soon be no level of talent that escapes it. That’s a scary notion.

Over the past 30 years, while we weren’t looking, reputation became something more malevolent and far more powerful. There are no fresh starts. The only way to reinvent oneself and try again is to break the last rule in a workplace world that has no real honor left, and to lie, and not just to lie but to support the lie with false social proof that can be bought, like any other commodity, on the Internet. I won’t take a position either way on whether it’s right for people to lie on their CVs or in job interviews. I’ll only note that most people have few other defenses against a more powerful adversary that can manipulate reputation against individual interests. It’s ideal not to have to lie to get jobs, but some people have no better way to fix their reputations and I don’t especially fault them for it. We live in a superficial, stupid world where “Mr. Kim” gets jobs that “Kim” can’t.

As the Internet came online, optimists viewed it as the most important publishing tool to come about since Gutenberg– and they turned out to be right. Yet, we ignored the risks: that our corporate masters would use this tool to surveil us. We now live in a world where not having a LinkedIn profile is, like some people’s natural hair, “political”; and where most people unknowingly sign away their legal rights when they interview for a job (to sue over bad references) as well as when they take one (if their company has a binding arbitration clause). Opting out isn’t really possible. The corporate masters have won. In a split second, they can (and do) manipulate this miasma of information that comprises “reputation” and destroy anyone they want. Anyone who doesn’t think the top corporate executives, hedge-fund supercapitalists, and Sand Hill Road king-makers use the same “troll farms” that splattered barf all over the 2016 election… isn’t paying attention.

When the world needed labor, most of us (often self-anointed) “talented” people were able to outrun “the other guy”, if the not the bear. This time, the forest floor’s littered with half-eaten corpses of “other guys” and the bear’s still coming. This surveillance/reputation capitalism beast we unwittingly created, we barely understand it, and not one of us is really free of it.

So, let’s discuss Trump. First of all, there’s a perception that Trumpism is about white male “emasculation” as we move from an industrial to a service economy. I prefer not to think of it in terms of emasculation, because any humiliating thing that men should not have to put up with, women should also not have to put up with. However, surveillance/reputation capitalism is objectively humiliating. No one of any gender should have to live under it. What some people see in Trump is a man who beat a bad reputation (which, in his case, he earned) and won in spite of being despised by the upper-middle classes (whom the working classes conflate with “the rich”). By winning in spite of a negative reputation, he slew the dragon; it doesn’t matter (for some) that he’s a ghoul who leaned heavily on reputation’s perversities (e.g., the sexist assault on a woman’s character because of her husband’s failings) to win.

One can dissect Trump and his reputation in a variety of ways. His reputation is negative in the sense of this low character has been obvious for decades, but his “brand” is the only think he actually built with any competence. How negative could his reputation be, if he could turn it into such a successful brand? He exploited an obvious, degenerate trait in our society: that after the 1980s, being an asshole became a status symbol. There’s probably more to analyze here than there is time to analyze it, and Trump’s defeat of the reputation monster is an illusion. With his wealth and contacts, he never had any trouble getting inside said monster and making it do what he wanted.

Demand for talent, and therefore its market value, seems to decrease. This scares me. Taking a long-term perspective, the world still needs talent. Only one-fifth of the world has been lifted out of miserable poverty, and the planet gets hotter every year. However, the world’s running just fine on the terms of the people in charge. From their perspective, they’d probably prefer a world with less talent, so they can’t be challenged. And although there’ve been no improvements in the accuracy of this tool called reputation, it now comes with shocking (if false) precision.

Perhaps not 85 or 95, but 100, percent of us will be forced to live on our reputations, like talentless hacks. It’s hard to come up with an alternative.

Back

What a winter it’s been. Not the weather. That’s been mild. Too mild. I miss the Midwestern winter, with its perfect 23 °F (-5 °C) days and snow. No, what has happened over the past few months hasn’t winter’s fault. My health hasn’t been ideal, though it seems to be springing back to place; and earlier this year, someone tried to extort me. Unfortunately but fortunately, I know this person and I’m not terribly worried.

Enough about that.

I fell behind on Farisa’s Crossing: a couple months, with mediocre writing progress. That was unplanned, but probably necessary. I doubt I’ll have a ready book by October 1, 2018. If I pursue traditional publishing– and, although I’m likely to turn down anything but a lead-title deal, I ought to at least try it– then it certainly won’t be out till 2019 (possibly 2020). If I self-publish, early 2019 is the best bet. Writing a novel isn’t hard. I’ve written several “books”: essay series, the unpublished early drafts of Farisa, and I’m sure the 905 blog posts (there’ve got to be 40 or 50 good ones in there) that I’ve never published could be turned into some kind of salable book. I could turn out a 60,000-word potboiler in a week (and, if I can’t make it in tech for some reason, I may have to write dinosaur erotica, because I’ve heard there’s money in that particular banana stand) if I had the connections to make it economically feasible.

No, writing a book isn’t hard. Writing a significant novel is hard. I figure that one can expect two hours of reading/research for every hour writing (which includes revising) and five hours of revising for every hour of primary writing. So, divide 150,000 words by 1,500-words-per-hour and multiply times eighteen: 1,800 hours. Add 30 percent for administration (e.g., finding beta readers, hiring editors, promotion) and you’re around 2,300. A year of work. Not a year of office work– the 2-hour-days that stretch out over 10 because of social nonsense– but a year of real work. Now, it’s easier than it sounds because it’s an enjoyable process and the time flies by. But even then, you’re haunted by the possibility that you might not be as good as you think you are, or people tell you that you are, et cetera. The only way to know for sure is to finish it… and then hope it sells, which is often uncorrelated to literary quality (and usually has the most to do with how well your book is promoted, which depends on internal politics at the publishing house) but of essential importance for getting the next book published.

The good news is that, even in a slowdown on my main project, I’ve been active. I’ve managed to keep my side interests relevant to my overall direction. For example, one of my recent improvements to Farisa’s Crossing was to replace an awkward on-the-nose conversation with a card game that does a better job of foreshadowing character development. Not afraid to toot my own horn, I used Ambition; although in Farisa’s world they call it ehrgeiz. There was a problem, though. For several years, I was aware of a design flaw in the game– and I wouldn’t want to risk my book drawing attention to the game in its flawed state. However, it took me a while (including about a month of trial and error) to figure out how to fix it.

What was wrong with Ambition, in its earlier form? What seemed innovative (a game-ending condition triggered by the losing player) and merciful– the ending at four (originally three) strikes– didn’t work well in practice. It created king-maker scenarios, it forced people into weird strategic positions, and it sometimes ended the game too early and sometimes too late. This wouldn’t necessarily annoy a first-time player, but as someone who wrote the game, it bothered me. Armed with a computer and the knowledge of how to use it, I ran various potential fixes through hundreds of thousands of simulated games and, eventually, figured out how to get the game to end at about the right time. (Obviously, this is a subjective question; but, there are statistically sound ways to look at it.) Now I’m writing an AI for Ambition, because I want people to be able to play the game (against something more competent than a random-legal-move player) without having to convince three other people to sit down for a card game they’ve probably never heard of.

To add to the challenge for the AI-for-Ambition project, I want it to run anywhere, so I’m not using any libraries but C’s standard ones. For example, I wrote my own linear regression solver. (I’m sure it’s slower and less numerically stable than what I’d use under other circumstances; but for my purposes, that’s not an issue.) The game itself doesn’t even use malloc and free, though the training process (which relies on evolving neural networks) does. So, if you want to train an AI game player on your toaster, keep that in mind.

My first approach was to write the most naive player I could think of: a static, layered neural net (e.g. 558-350-150-50-1) that treated each game variable as an input, and attempted to Q-learn a “heuristic” valuation for actions-per-state, then choose the best action. There were about 550 variables; for example, there was a 0/1 variable corresponding to whether a player held the 7♦, and fifty-one other ones for each card. How’d it work? Not very well, unfortunately.

That approach can work for perfect-knowledge, deterministic games, but I think the hidden information and probabilistic nature of the card game had the AI player bouncing about randomly, with each iteration of SGD, without much progress, because the theoretical convergence of stochastic gradient descent is cold comfort when (a) the environment itself is highly stochastic, and (b) I have better things to do than muck about with learning rates. After 12 hours of training, the damn thing wasn’t playing any better than a random-legal-move player. In order to make sure the neural net was, in fact, training at all; I used it again to assess a static dataset from a few hundred thousand games, and while training error reduced (establishing that the neural net itself did work) neither test-set error nor performance at the game improved. My guess is that the neural net was over-parameterized, causing it to evolve from and under-fit state to an over-fit state without any true learning.

Writing a decent AI for a card game isn’t hard. If that were the only goal, I’d probably be done: I’d get “dirty” and use rollouts and Monte Carlo tree search and my own knowledge about the game, and it wouldn’t take long to get a passable player. I’m still hoping, though, that I can get a model-free player to work. I want this damn thing to teach me about the game, rather than me having to teach it.

My next approach (what I’m working on now) is to hybridize gradient-based training and evolutionary techniques (e.g., NEAT) that favor simple network topologies. The change I intend to make to NEAT is how speciation is handled. Rather than down-moderating fitness for large species in what appears to be an ad hoc way– a fitness function ought to be shift- and scale-invariant, meaning you get the same results from f(x) and 17*f(x – 39), so dividing fitness by species population is mathematically meaningless– I intend to use speciation (if I need it, and if I’m lucky, I may not) to allocate training time. What I want is a sparse, genetic approach to network topology, but a gradient-based approach (with occasional clone-and-reinitialize-randomly steps) to weight selection.

We’ll see if it works. My prediction is that the naive model-free variant (i.e., here are 600 variables; figure it out) won’t work, but that with some explicit feature engineering (i.e., a pre-arranged design of the network that pools like information with like, similar to how a convolutional neural network exploits the 2D topology of an image) it will get there. I want to avoid rollouts and MCTS in training– they’ll slow everything down– but I’ll probably implement them when I write a user-facing player (in which case, milliseconds and even seconds are acceptable “thinking” time). Those, coupled with a simple heuristic (even linear regression based on 100,000 games of training data) could be enough.

Ambition for AI may be one of the last “serious” hard program I write. I’m approaching 35, which is half of the Biblical “three score and ten”. It’s time to put away childish things. Is programming a childish thing? Absolutely not. It’s a useful skill and I’m glad I have it. Corporate programming, however, I seem to have aged out of. Back when programming was an R&D job, instead of this Agile Scrotum nonsense, software was a perfectly fine thing to do into late middle age. However, the naive belief I once had that the life of a private-sector programmer could be fulfilling… that somehow the world would get back to a state where software engineers were trusted professionals, like researchers; as opposed to rent-a-coders constantly competing with unqualified cheap hacks… well, that’s gone. Silicon Valley is a resource-extraction culture, similar to the Gulf States, but instead of the finite resource being petroleum, it’s the good faith of the American middle class, and the memory of a reasonably meritocratic mid-century, that’s being tapped. It will run out soon; I’m surprised 2008 didn’t drink that milkshake outright. Anyway, as I said, I’m almost 35. Technology’s important and I’d like to still be a part of it, but… the crisis of conscience I have about my industry’s role in gutting the American middle class hits me every day now.

Also, I’m going to die soon. No, I’m not terminally ill; and by “soon”, I mean 50 years, more likely than 5. I’m not dying any faster than anyone else my age; but I cannot ignore that I will someday die.

I find most religion paradoxically nihilistic– “our god is good because he is powerful and he burns dead people who don’t believe he exists”– and I am closer to atheism than to any organized religion, but one of my personal beliefs is that reincarnation is likely true; that existence is eternal (or, at least, very long) but that every moment matters. Fifty years is the blink of an eye, and it’s on me to make my time mean something. I need to get back to work– real work– and finish my book.

One of the things that amuses me is that all adults (and most children, after about six) know that we’re going to die, and yet, we ignore this basic fact. We behave as if it’s not true or doesn’t matter. What would happen if people truly understood their mortality? Corporate America would fall within 5 minutes. Okay, okay; make it 10, because some people would have to finish up in the bathrooms, but the principle holds. Rich people would stop showing up at jobs that, even though they get to give orders, they still hate; the middle classes would leverage everything they’ve got to get some other kind of work; the poor who have no other options would unionize. This basic fact about life– that it ends, and that we have no idea what comes after it– is something we all know, but our denial of it keeps the whole system going. Hold aside for now the unexamined life; we, as a culture, can’t even examine a small (but important) part of life, which is death.

When you do anything important, you have to face death. See, most corporate work is so monotonous and meaningless that one can go completely numb, and thereby forget one’s own mortality. Death will at least be interesting, an escape from the idiocy. Die at your desk? Your boss has to deal with a corpse. That image is humorous enough that one laughs the scare away… for about forty seconds, which is long enough to get distracted and forget about the whole death thing.

Perhaps it’s not because they ignore death that people work in corporate jobs; perhaps they do it to ignore death. Aldous Huxley said that a heroin addict “lives his 24 months in eternity”, while the non-user lives “only in time”. I disagree with the sentiment; personally, I’d rather live in time, and make something of myself (as Huxley in fact did, in spite of this quote) because either eternity or nonexistence (which is not to be feared) awaits, no matter what I do. Yet, on Huxley’s point, I’d argue that corporate work has the same effect, without heroin’s deleterious effect on life expectancy.

The corporate illusion is one of monotonic progress. “We have a better culture.” “We’re going to crush our competitors.” “World domination.” The corporate eros is bland, colorless, and ultimately quite pathetic; but thanatos is completely absent. Companies no longer fire people or have layoffs; they “streamline” and “improve performance”. All of this is a total denial of impermanence and the inevitability of decay. Then, when companies meet reality and cannot continue monotonic expansion, their reaction is paroxysmal and harsh, so much so that individuals within fear for their jobs and standing, and focus on only on short-term survival (because corporate cults have convinced people to conceive of a job ending as a death, to the point where we even use mortal lingo). Never, whether in the silly expansive mode or the nefarious struggle for political survival, does the corporate denizen have time to think about the fact that he’s imperceptibly approaching his own demise– the real one, after which job titles and bank accounts mean nothing.

Like Farisa, I’m more of an anti-nihilist than anything else. I oppose the devaluation of everything authentic that I see in the corporate world. I believe that what I do in this life matters. Whether it’s eternal, that’s not for me to know yet, but the possible finitude of existence doesn’t render it meaningless. My job, in this life, is to do something authentic. Something that matters. Something real.

If you do something real, though– something worth actually caring about, like finishing a novel and turning it into a series that stands a chance to outlive you– you confront your mortality. You ask, “What if I die tomorrow?” “What if I never get to finish this?” It’s a harrowing thought. My advice, though I’m in no position to give any, would be to focus on the creative process rather than the end results, especially when so many of those are under external control. That’s easier said than done, though. It’s largely advice to myself, that I should take.

I’ve still been thinking, ideas forming and others dissolving, and I’m back to writing.

Memento mori. Refuse to forget, as the corporate lords require that you do, that death is coming and every moment at least ought to matter.